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ABSTRACT 
When one considers the Contras—the forces that 
opposed the Sandinista government of Nicaragua—the natural 
propensity is to view these forces as a monolithic 
institution. The purpose of this thesis is to draw a clear 
distinction between the Contras that were based in Honduras 
and the Southern Opposition Front (SOF) that was based in 
Costa Rica; more than geography separated these two fronts 
that opposed the FSLN government in the Contra War. In 
order to draw this distinction, this thesis will first 
offer a chronology of the Southern Front from its 
beginnings in 1980 through the declared cessation of 
hostilities in 1988. Following this, the reasons why the 
SOF came into existence will be examined through the 
application of the Collapsible Pyramid Model as presented 
by Jan Knippers Black and by reviewing the motivation 
behind US foreign policy toward Central America in the 
1980s. Finally, five political science definitions will be 
presented in order to position the SOF Contras along the 
political continuum. The SOF's history was profoundly 
different from the Contra experience in Honduras and the 
impetus for its formation was likewise different. A variety 
of factors contributed to the failure of the SOF as both a 
political and a military organization. 
To you, the yet unnamed child that grows within your 
mother: 
"If my heart could do my thinking 
and my head begin to feel, 
I would look upon the world anew 
and know what is truly real." 
Van Morrison 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 1979 nearly everyone who participated in the 
Nicaraguan insurgency movement to overthrow the forty-five 
year old dynasty of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Luis Somoza 
Debayle, and Anastasio Somoza Debayle considered themselves 
Sandinistas. After Anastasio Somoza Debayle fled the 
country, the leadership of the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional-
-FSLN) was faced with the task of facilitating the 
transition of its role from that of a force to oust the 
Somoza regime to the role of governing the new Nicaragua as 
a vanguard party. The armed opposition to the FSLN 
consisted at first of exiled members of Somoza's National 
Guard (Guardia Nacional—GN) . While the very nature of the 
FSLN victory in July 1979 created an armed opposition force 
comprised of disgruntled National Guardsmen, it was the 
controversial actions of the FSLN government in its 
attempts to consolidate the Revolution that served as the 
impetus behind the formation of the true Contra opposition 
force. As the power of the FSLN's National Directorate 
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(Direcci6n Nacional Conjunta—DNC) became increasingly 
assertive, the power of the Government of National 
Reconstruction (Gobierno de Reconstrucci6n Nacional—GRN) 
gradually declined. 
The Sandinistas labeled the former guardsmen as 
" C o n t r a s , " f o r c o n t r a r r e v o l u c i o n a r i o s 
(counterrevolutionaries). The Fifteenth of September 
League, under the command of former GN Col. Enrique 
Bermudez, became the representative organization of the 
former guardsmen and was based in Honduras. The stated, as 
well as the actual "mission" of the Contras, changed 
throughout the 1980s just as the Contra organization itself 
was reshuffled both in name and leadership.1 The 
establishment of a Southern Opposition Front (SOF) of 
Contras based along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rica border 
reached its fruition in 1982 when Eden Pastora—who had 
defected from the FSLN government nine months previously— 
announced in San Jose, Costa Rica that the Sandinistas 
should be removed from power. 2 The CIA saw in Pastora a 
symbol of authenticity that could be positively projected 
upon the Nicaraguan populace. In reality, Pastora and the 
CIA were constantly at odds over issues of autonomy and 
legitimacy between a) Pastora and his Contra group. 
Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria 
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Democr&tica—ARDE) , b) Enrique Bermtidez and his Contra 
group, Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democr&tica 
Nicaragiiense—FDN)—a consolidated and renamed version of 
the Fifteenth of September League—and c) the policy goals 
of the Reagan administration.3 The culmination of this 
animosity was the La Penca bombing, an assassination 
attempt against Pastora which investigative journalist 
Martha Honey asserts "became the watershed event in the 
U.S. -contra/Sandinista war along the Southern Front. I | 4 
Pastora "retired" and returned to the life of a fisherman 
in 1986 while covert US policymakers manipulated the SOF in 
Costa Rica into a force that was more responsive to the 
objectives of their benefactors. 5 
In mid-1985, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, working 
through the "Enterprise" front company and collaborating 
with CIA Station Chief Joseph Fernandez, secured land in 
northern Costa Rica to construct an air strip in order to 
supply arms to the Southern Front.6 Peace-minded Costa 
Rican President Oscar Arias threatened to publicly disclose 
the operations at the Santa Elena air strip following 
repeated requests made to US officials to halt the resupply 
effort being conducted from Costa Rican territory. In late-
September 1986, the air strip was indeed closed; only a few 
short days later, Eugene Hasenfus was shot down over 
3 
southern Nicaragua in an "Enterprise" cargo plane. As the 
Iran-Contra Scandal was just beginning to unfold, the 
resupply operation was closing down. 7 Finally, in 1988, the 
International Commission on Verification and Follow-up 
(Comision Internacional de Verificacidn y Seguimiento— 
CIVS)—as established under the guidelines of the Central 
American Peace Accord—stated that Costa Rica had indeed 
complied with Point 6 of the Accord: Nonuse of territory 
for aggression against other countries.* 
Whereas Honduras and Costa Rica became the base sites 
for many of the Contras, more than mere geography separated 
the Contras forces. Prior to the sweeping revelations of 
the Iran-Contra affair and the Esguipulas peace 
initiatives, scholar Esperanza Duran advocated the need for 
drawing a distinction between the Contra groups. 9 
Furthermore, the entire Southern Opposition Front (SOF) 
received only limited attention in terms of media coverage 
and US foreign policy focus when compared to the Contras 
based in Honduras. Likewise, the scholarly coverage indeed 
offers several studies of the Contras; however, these 
studies are not without their limitations—either by time 
frame or scope of focus—in the treatment of the SOF. 
The literature concerning the Contras spans several 
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different areas of study. Four basic categories of 
research—with some overlap, of course—exist: 1) history 
as interpreted by journalists, 2) history as interpreted by 
scholars and policy analysts, 3) political science-based 
studies that focus on inter-American/regional relations, 
international relations, and/or US foreign policy issues, 
and 4) the literature concerning the coverage of the Iran-
Contra affair. This broad spectrum of information and their 
sources can be daunting to the scholar in search of concise 
yet significant data on the Contras and the SOF f in 
particular. A brief review of some of the literature will 
bear witness to this. 
The 1985 book by Shirley Christian Nicaragua; 
Revolution in the Family10 is quite strong in terms of 
covering the FSLN insurgency against Somoza. The book even 
has a chapter devoted exclusively to the Contras as well as 
a chapter focused on the prominent Nicaraguans who left the 
country. Christian, however, does not deal with the La 
Penca bombing in 1984. Furthermore, the book was written in 
pre-Iran-Contra time period. Christopher Dickey's With the 
Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua11 (1985) is 
a strong journalistic account of the Contras and contains 
valuable anecdotal information that is passed over by the 
more scholarly works. Dickey's work likewise antedates the 
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Iran-Contra scandal and the attention that is given to the 
SOF, however, is predominantly centered around Eden 
Pastora. The 1991 book by Stephen Kinzer Blood of Brothers; 
Life and War in Nicaragua 1 2 interprets well the role of the 
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua within the context of national 
assimilation and counterrevolution in the post-Somoza 
period. Detail regarding the SOF, however, beyond the role 
of Pastora is somewhat sparse. Without a doubt, Glenn 
Garvin in his book Everybody Had His Own Gringo 1 3 (1992) 
provides the most colorful depiction of the Contras. This 
author's "insider" style offers the reader an abundance of 
interesting data that he gathered from an impressive list 
of interviewees. Garvin, however, did not utilize some of 
the more important primary source material available at the 
time. Hostile Acts: U.S. Policy in Costa Rica in the 
1980s 1 4 (1994) by journalist Martha Honey represents the 
most comprehensive account of the SOF as well as a fine 
diplomatic history of US, Nicaraguan, and Costa Rican 
relations during the Contra War. The author's timing with 
this project has allowed her to utilize a wealth of primary 
resource material. The book, by its nature, however, does 
not investigate the theoretical origins of the SOF. 
Dieter Eich and Carlos Rinc6n's The Contras: 
Interviews with Anti-Sandinistas 1 5 (1985 Eng. trans.) 
6 
provides a good chronology of the Contras' history yet the 
number of interviews presented by FDN Contras gives the 
reader a far better picture of the Honduran-based 
opposition forces. Furthermore, this book, researched prior 
to the Iran-Contra scandal, is not, by its nature, a 
diplomatic history of Nicaraguan, Costa Rican, and US 
relations. In Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention16 
(1987), author Peter Kornbluh devotes eight pages to the 
SOF compared to eighteen pages to the Honduran-based forces 
in the chapter entitled "The Military War. M Additionally, 
as Kornbluh describes the origins of the Contras—the FDN 
as well as ARDE—he never mentions the important role of 
the Chamorro Rapaccioli brothers, who were vital in the 
formation of the Contras and who played prominent 
leadership roles in ARDE following the La Penca bombing in 
1984 that targeted Ed6n Pastora. In Banana Diplomacy: The 
Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987 1 7 (1988), 
Roy Gutman provides an excellent synthesis of the US policy 
concepts and their respective "authors 1 1—both within and on 
the periphery of the Reagan administration regarding 
Nicaragua. Gutman gives perhaps the most detailed account 
of the role played by CIA operative and early Contra-
Washington liaison Duane (Dewey) Clarridge. Regarding the 
SOF, however, the author only occasionally mentions the 
Contra group UND/FARN and never mentions its co-leader "El 
7 
Negro" Chamorro Rappaccioli. Furthermore, the La Penca 
bombing is mentioned only in passing. Washington's War on 
Nicaragua 1 8 (1988), by Holly Sklar draws from an impressive 
bibliography which contributes to two sections contained in 
two separate chapters which deal with the SOF. Whereas 
Sklar is able to utilize some of the publications 
concerning the Iran-Contra Affair to buttress her 
assertions, some primary resource material was yet 
unavailable at the time of the book's printing. In 
Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua 1 9 (1991, ed. 
Thomas W. Walker) Peter Kornbluh contributes a chapter, 
"The U.S. Role in the Counterrevolution." The author 
incorporates some very valuable primary resource material 
within the twenty-six page chapter. The purpose of the 
chapter, however, is to provide the reader with a survey 
view of the US involvement in the Contra War—both the 
Honduran and Costa Rican fronts—and is therefore not a 
specific or detailed study of the SOF. Contra political 
officer Rogelio Pardo-Maurer offers a comprehensive study 
of the anti-Sandinista groups in The Contras.1980-1989: A 
Special Kind of Politics 2 0 (1990). Whereas the work's title 
encompasses a nine year period, the emphasis is clearly on 
the time frame of Lt. Col. North's involvement in Central 
American foreign policy; little mention is made of Alfonso 
Robelo's feud with the FSLN and his subsequent departure 
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from the legal institutions of Nicaraguan political 
participation. Two other works likewise belong in this 
category: Robert Pastor's Condemned to Repetition: The 
United States and Nicaragua21 (1987), and Anthony Lake's 
Somoza Falling22 (1989). Both books are extremely valuable 
in terms of gaining a perspective on the foreign policy 
process within the context of the exit of Somoza and the 
ascension to power by the FSLN. While the two works also 
provide an excellent account of the historical antecedents 
of the Reagan administration-FSLN relations of the 1980s, 
neither book represents a detailed study of the SOF. 
Several works exist that should be considered 
political science studies of regional and international 
relations. The June 1984 publication, "Costa Rica: The 
Conflict Over Stabilization and Neutrality, 1983-84 m 2 3 by 
Lowell Gudmundson, Robert Tomasek's work, "The 
Deterioration of Relations Between Costa Rica and the 
Sandinistas"24 (1984) , and the 1987 article by William L. 
Furlong, "Costa Rica: Caught Between Two Worlds" 2 5 are all 
very similar in their thematic focus. The three works are 
all concerned with the issue of the SOF; however, all three 
works tend to concentrate on the SOF within the context of 
Costa Rican neutrality vis-a-vis the Contras and Nicaragua 
and are therefore not specific studies of the SOF. Costa 
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Rica en los anos /80 2 6 by Jorge Rovira Mas (1987) 
demonstrates the interaction between the economic crisis of 
the early 1980s, the subsequent Costa Rican social unrest, 
and US foreign policy; the SOF is likewise covered from the 
standpoint of the Costa Rican neutrality. Costa Rica: 
Politica exterior y crisis centroamericana27 by Francisco 
Rojas Aravena (1990) details the foreign policy process of 
the Carazo and Monge administrations as well as the Central 
American peace process. The book deals indirectly with the 
SOF as it relates to Costa Rican politics and to the 
regional peace process. Additionally, Rojas Aravena edited 
the 1990 book Costa Rica y el sistema internacional. The 
chapter contributed by Luis Guillermo Soils28 on US-Costa 
Rican relations, the chapter by Melvin S&enz Biolley29 on 
Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations, and Silvia 
Charpentier's30 contribution on the Costa Rican foreign 
debt are indeed germane to a study of the SOF. The SOF, 
however, is briefly mentioned within the context of foreign 
policy. 
A reasonable amount of literature exists concerning 
the peace plans that were formulated throughout the 1980s. 
Francisco Rojas Aravena's article "1985: Afio del Impasse de 
Contadora"31 (1986) and the transcript of one of his 
conference paper's ME1 Proceso de Esquipulas: El desarrollo 
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conceptual y los mecanismos operativos"32 (1989) serve as 
material in his above-mentioned book. Robert Tomasek 
presented the paper "United States Policy toward the 
Contadora Peace Process in 1984 and 1985"33 (1986) which 
analyzed the various points of the Contadora Treaty drafts 
in terms of their advantages and disadvantages within the 
context of US policy objectives vis-£~vis the nations of 
the region; the SOF receives little direct mention. The 
1987 paper "A Comparative Analysis of Peace Proposals for 
Central America: Contadora, the Reagan-Wright Plan, and the 
Arias Peace Agreement"34 by Tomasek mentions some of the 
concerns the Costa Ricans had regarding the subversion that 
some felt was a Nicaraguan export to their neighbors to the 
south in the early 1980s. Tomasek also discusses the issues 
related to the Santa Elena airstrip but from the standpoint 
of how the closing of the facility further legitimized the 
peace efforts of President Arias in the region. 
The literature dealing with the Iran-Contra affair 
has gone through an evolutionary process as more data is 
gleaned from once-classified documents. The validity of the 
sources, especially in this instance, often reflect their 
publication dates. The Tower Commission Report35 (1987) and 
its companion index is obviously concerned with the SOF; 
however, the coverage of the SOF deals primarily with the 
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Contra resupply effort operated from the Santa Elena 
airstrip. The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account 
of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras 3 6 
as coordinated by the National Security Archive in 1987 is 
an extremely valuable tool in terms of gaining a 
perspective of the time-frame of the Iran-Contra affair. 
Furthermore, this work fills in many of the gaps that one 
may encounter in the Tower Commission Report. The nature of 
The Chronology, however, is to give the reader an account 
of the Iran-Contra affair and not a detailed analysis. 
Another National Security Archive publication—edited by 
Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne—is The Iran-Contra 
Scandal: The Declassified History37 (1993) which takes the 
research into the Iran-Contra affair to a higher level by 
using a variety of declassified documents to support the 
historical interpretation. What is common to this book is 
likewise common to the other books that deal with the SOF 
within the context of the Iran-Contra affair: the majority 
of the coverage is devoted to Lt. Col. Oliver North's 
efforts to revive the SOF—minus Pastora—in Costa Rica. 
The literature review of the SOF leads to some 
important conclusions. When considering the broad topic of 
the Contras and the SOF, there is no great dearth of 
information. On the other hand, the information is often 
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part of a peripheral subject and, therefore, lacks direct 
attention to the SOF. Furthermore, the Honduran-based 
Contras often end up with the lion's share of the coverage 
of the Contra War. Another limitation to gaining a more 
complete picture of the SOF has been the works published 
prior to the Iran-Contra affair versus those which were 
published in the post-Reagan time period. These conclusions 
partially serve as the impetus for the following work. 
The purpose of this present study is to examine the 
SOF of the Contra War and, through analysis, comparison, 
and description, to clarify and dispel the historical or 
extant perceptions that the Contras represented a 
monolithic institution. By synthesizing the existing Contra 
literature with some of the relatively yet untapped primary 
sources, this study will present a more comprehensive and 
focused view of the SOF in Costa Rica. Throughout the 
course of the paper, this study will address many questions 
and issues that will distinguish and describe the SOF and 
the role it played in the schemata of Central American 
politics in the 1980s. The first chapter will be a 
chronology of the SOF. This chapter will examine the basic 
evolution of the SOF as well as explain both the groups and 
the leaders involved. This chapter will also be a military 
history of the SOF which will focus on the political 
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significance of the military operations. In the second 
chapter, the question "Why the SOF Contras?" will be 
posited and answered—by using a theoretical model—from 
the standpoint of a Nicaraguan political perspective and a 
US foreign policy perspective. The final chapter will 
examine the issues concerning how the SOF is categorized 
through political science and vernacular definitions. 
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CHAPTER II 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE SOF CONTRAS 
This chapter will represent an historical account of the 
evolution of the SOF from 1980-1988. The evolution of the 
SOF can best be followed by considering their history as 
moving through four distinct phases: 1) the proto-Contras: 
1980-the formation of ARDE, 2) the SOF alliance: September 
1982-the La Penca bombing, 3) the divided SOF: June 1984-
disclosure of the Santa Elena airstrip, and 4) the SOF End 
Game: September 1986-January 1988. Within each historic 
phase, the research will focus on: a) the prominent SOF 
leaders and their respective organizations and their 
subsequent activities, b) the combat activities of the SOF 
and their political-military significance, and c) a survey 
of the major funding sources of the SOF. As was noted in 
the introduction to this present study, the various Contra 
groups were often viewed as a monolithic institution. 
Whereas the primary purpose of this chapter is to present 
an historical chronology of the SOF, the underlying purpose 
is to draw the distinction between not only the SOF and 
Honduran-based Contras but to draw the distinction between 
the diverse Contra groups that fit under the broad umbrella 
of the Southern Opposition Front. 
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The proto-Contra phase of the SOF: 1980-September 1982 
The proto-Contra phase of the Contra War, in general, 
encompasses the time period between when diverse opposition 
groups were assembling in places like Tegucigalpa, San 
Jose, and Miami and when some of these groups coalesced 
into a more formalized alliance structure. As for the SOF, 
this time period ranges from shortly after the FSLN victory 
in July 1979 and concludes with the formation of ARDE in 
September 1982. 
During the proto-Contra phase, the groups that 
eventually found themselves in San Jose represented nothing 
short of a diverse field. Some of the groups in this phase 
established themselves as major participants in the Contra 
War for the next several years; other groups were either 
absorbed into other organizations or merely fell by the 
wayside as the process of acquiring funds, at times, was 
rather competitive. Nevertheless, an interesting array of 
SOF proto-Contra political and military groups existed 
prior to the formation of ARDE in September 1982. 
19 
15 September Legion 
The Legion eventually merged with some of the other 
Honduran-based proto-Contra groups to form the FDN. The 
Legion and then the FDN, however, maintained a presence in 
Costa Rica from the early days of the Contra War. The 
leadership of the Legion was known to include former 
members of the GN; Defense Department intelligence even 
referred to the Legion as a "Somocista" group in a mid-1982 
report.1 Just as CIA Washington-Contra liaison Duane 
"Dewey" Clarridge was dealing with Eden Pastora in early 
1982, "the CIA hedged its bets by creating a small, 
parallel FDN army in Costa Rica."2 Most of the Legion 
joined the FDN when that umbrella group was founded in late 
1981. Whereas the majority of the FDN moved to Honduras, 
small groups were indeed sent into Costa Rica where they 
established political offices in San Jose as well as 
training camps in the Guanacaste area of northwestern Costa 
Rica.3 
The Legion was also very instrumental in forging 
links with the Argentines. The first significant Contra 
attack was launched by Legion forces in December 1980 
against the Argentine leftist shortwave radio station in 
Grecia, Costa Rica Radio Noticias del Continents. The 
government of Argentine President Roberto Viola clearly 
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wanted the station out of operation; the Argentine 
government believed that the station Mwas the voice of 
communism couched in the rhetoric of human rights. , f 4 In 
spite of the fact that the mission against Radio Noticias 
del Continente was considered a failed fiasco as the 
leader, former GN Captain Hugo Villagra (Visage) and other 
participating Legionnaires were jailed, the Argentine army 
remained resolved to sponsoring a Nicaraguan exile force. 
Almost a full year prior to US President Ronald Reagan's 
more formalized support for the Contras, the Argentines 
viewed members of the Legion—as well as others—as 
potential recruits. Throughout the proto-Contra time 
period, the FDN Contras established a significant base of 
operation in Costa Rica where Costa Rican security 
estimated that three hundred FDN Contras were training in 
the northern area of the country. Furthermore, the FDN had 
networked well with security forces and right-wing elements 
throughout Costa Rica.5 
CDDN (Committee in Defense of Democracy in Nicaragua) 
This political group was originally formed in the 
early 1980s in Caracas, Venezuela. Its president was Tor 
Halvorsen, a Norwegian native, who headed the Venezuelan 
Tourist Corporation and was a close friend of former 
Venezuelan president Carlos Andrfes P&rez. Halvorsen was 
likewise one of the early middlemen for CIA funds being 
funneled through Venezuela. The CDDN as a CIA-funded 
organization opened an office in San Jose in 1982 and was 
headed there by Nicaraguan lawyer Francisco Aviles. The 
CDDN, however, clearly favored the FDN versus the early 
SOF. In San Jose, they used CIA funds to set up pro-FDN 
Radio Impacto as well as build support among the Costa 
Rican ultra-right.6 
ECN (Nicaraguan Christian Army) 
The ECN was also known as the ECLIN (Christian Army 
of Liberation of Nicaragua). The ECN was based in northern 
Costa Rica and was led by Dr. Roberto Constantino Pineda. 
This small group, according to intelligence sources, 
received no outside support and was believed to be largely 
inactive. As some of the members of the ECN were thought to 
have been former members of the GN, perhaps the ECN moved 
to Honduras where they were absorbed by the FDN or perhaps 
they became part of the FDN contingency that eventually 
operated out of US expatriate John Hull's ranch in northern 
Costa Rica. 7 
FAD (Democratic Armed Force) 
FAD was reportedly a small resistance group that was 
composed mainly of young ex-Sandinistas operating within 
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Nicaragua with supporters in Guatemala, Honduras, as well 
as Costa Rica. FAD suffered a severe set-back in mid-1980 
when two key leaders were arrested by FSLN security 
forces.8 As with many of the other proto-Contra groups, FAD 
was most likely either absorbed into a larger organization 
or faded into obscurity. 
27 May Command 
This group was believed to be merely a desk 
organization in San Jose whose members were remnants of the 
Honduran-based organization headed by former Somoza 
business partner Pedro Ortega "Juan Carlos" Macho, the ENL 
(National Liberation Army). It seems that the claims made 
by the 27 May Command were, in some cases, so fantastic 
that the CIA seriously doubted their validity.9 
15 September Legion 
This group should not be confused with the 15 
September Legion that was integrated with the FDN based in 
Honduras. Led by former GN Captain Justiano Perez, this 15 
September Legion left the other, more mainstream "Legion" 
when it aligned with the other groups to form the FDN. The 
renegade "Legion" was more of a terrorist group than a 
proto-Contra paramilitary organization as it was 
responsible for three airport-related terrorist acts— 
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including the hijacking of a Costa Rican SANSA airliner 
from San Jose in October 19 81. 1 0 
UDN/FARN (Nicaraguan Democratic Union/Nicaraguan 
Revolutionary Armed Forces) 
The three key leaders of UDN/FARN in the proto-Contra 
phase were brothers Fernando (El Negro) and Edmundo 
(Comandante Uno and Sabastian) Chamorro Rappaccioli and— 
until the formation of the FDN—Jose Francisco (El Chicano) 
Cardenal. Fernando Chamorro was first an anti-Somocista 
with a combat record that goes back to the late 1950s when 
he and his brother, Edmundo, were students. The Brothers 
Chamorro were involved in the siege of two GN barracks in 
Jinotepe and Diriamba in November 1960. The incident served 
as the inspiration for the name of their guerrilla 
organization, "The November 11 Movement" (N-ll). The 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Nicaragua (FARN), formed 
in late 1980 as the military wing of UDN, appear to be a 
more formalized extension of N-ll. 1 1 
During the anti-Somoza insurgency of the late 1970s, 
the Chamorro brothers served with Eden Pastora along the 
Southern Front and Fernando Chamorro was responsible for a 
rocket attack launched against the GN bunker across the 
street from the Hotel Inter-Continental in Managua. 1 2 
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Throughout the anti-Somoza insurgency, N-ll favored a more 
traditionally democratic outcome to the conflict. In 
October 1978, N-ll even claimed that it had forced the 
"Extremists to sign an agreement that if triumph is 
achieved it will have to be a democratic form of 
government. " 1 3 
Immediately following the FSLN victory, "El Negro" 
Chamorro returned to his Chevrolet dealership in Managua. 1 4 
Chamorro's name resurfaced, however, in 1981 when he was 
named as among the important leaders of the Internal Front 
of the N-ll counterrevolutionary group—at that point 
integrated with UND/FARN. Furthermore, the source went on 
to state that "El Negro" had received training in Argentina 
and Honduras as well as having received $50,000 from the 
Argentines in order to purchase weapons in Miami for 
shipment to Honduras. 1 5 Chamorro continued to shuffle the 
FARN forces back and forth from Honduras and Costa Rica 
until the formation of ARDE in late 1982. In early 1982, 
"El Negro" was the target of an assassination attempt at 
his apartment in San Jose. 1 6 
Edmundo Chamorro, along with his brother Fernando, 
were the two principal leaders of N-ll, FARN, and its 
associated political organization UDN (Uni6n Democratica 
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Nicaragiiense). Following the FSLN victory of 1979, Edmundo 
chose exile rather than returning to private life in 
Nicaragua like his brother's immediate choice. In fact, in 
the Contra literature dealing with the time period prior to 
the formation of ARDE, Edmundo usually commanded more 
headline space than his brother. In August 1980, Edmundo 
was arrested, along with five other N-ll guerrillas, by 
Costa Rican officials for arms trafficking. Furthermore, 
Edmundo accompanied his brother on the 1981 trip to 
Argentina and then Miami which netted first money and then 
weapons and food for the small UDN/FARN forces based, at 
that time, near the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. 1 7 
In late 1980, shortly after the formation of 
UDN/FARN, Edmundo Chamorro and fellow UDN/FARN co-founder 
and leader Jose Francisco Cardenal wanted to include the 
newly elected Reagan administration in the Contra struggle. 
Shortly after the 1980 US Presidential victory of Ronald 
Reagan, Chamorro sent a proposal letter of Contra action 
drafted by Cardenal to national security adviser nominee 
Richard Allen; the letter was sent standard post from San 
Jose. Allen's office clearly lacked the appreciation for 
the significance of the letter as Chamorro was sent a form 
letter that never reached him because Allen's staff mailed 
the letter to Chamorro in San Jose with neither a street 
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address nor a postal box number. Chamorro perhaps read the 
letter along with much of the Nicaraguan populace after 
FSLN agents or sympathizers in the Costa Rican post office 
intercepted the letter bound for Chamorro and forwarded it 
to Managua where it was printed on the front page of 
Barricada. 1 8 
The third key leader—as well as the leader with the 
shortest tenure—in UDN/FARN was Jose Francisco (El 
Chicano) Cardenal. Cardenal participated in UND/FARN only 
after moving through a personal process that resembled that 
of Alfonso Robelo: anti-Somocista, Sandinista, anti-
Sandinista. Cardenal was part of the contingent of 
businessmen associated with COSIP which opposed Somoza 
during the insurgency. In April 1980—during the crisis of 
the FSLN-initiated realignment of the Council of State and 
Alfonso Robelo's subsequent resignation—Cardenal 
reluctantly accepted the position of vice-president to the 
Council. A number of days later, Cardenal likewise resigned 
and fled to San Jose and then eventually to Miami "where he 
began to search for the means to overthrow the 
Sandinistas. " 1 9 
In May 1980, Cardenal made contact with anti-
Sandinista businessman Jorge Salazar and former GN Col. 
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Enrique Bermtidez. Cardenal and Bermudez formed the 
political/military group ADRIN (Nicaraguan Revolutionary 
Democratic Alliance). By November 1980—the time of 
Salazar's death—ADRIN had accomplished little more than 
the establishment of political organizations in some US 
cities and in Costa Rica. The group split up over several 
issues including Cardenal's misgivings about being 
associated with former members of the GN; the dissolution 
of ADRIN directly led to the formation of UND/FARN in late 
1980. Whereas Bermudez left the organization and retained 
the 15 September Legion name, Cardenal and other civilian 
leaders formed UDN and established a military wing under 
the name of FARN which included Orlando Bolanos and the 
Chamorro brothers of N-ll. Following the trip to Argentina 
by the Chamorro brothers, Cardenal received word from the 
Argentine military that stated that more assistance would 
be forthcoming but that it was conditioned on an alliance 
of the exile forces. 2 0 
In an ironic way, the first real attempt at Contra 
unity facilitated the first schism. A group of Argentine 
military officers assembled several Nicaraguan exiles in 
Guatemala and the organization that was the product of that 
meeting was the FDN. Whereas the objective of this group 
was to integrate the civilian and military elements of the 
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Nicaraguan exile forces, Edmundo Chamorro and UDN/FARN left 
the newly-formed alliance while Cardenal and his faction of 
UDN remained more closely tied to the FDN. Cardenal and the 
Argentines maintained rather strained relations as Cardenal 
believed that the Argentines were far more concerned with 
eradicating communism from the Americas than they were with 
building a stable democratic foundation in Nicaragua.21 
Following Eden Pastora's "severance speech" in April 
1982 in San Jose in which he officially broke with the 
FSLN, Cardenal negotiated with Pastora and Robelo on behalf 
of the FDN with the hope of forging an alliance of the 
forces of the northern and southern fronts. In a rather 
maverick move, Cardenal offered the co-commandership of the 
Contra army—along with Bermudez—to Pastora and assured 
Robelo that the Contra political directorate would be 
expanded to include him as well. Pastora refused the offer 
as he would only accept the total exclusion of the former 
members of the GN. 2 2 
In spite of the fact that Pastora, Robelo, and 
Cardenal were high school buddies, the variable of 
personality was perhaps the greatest impediment to 
cooperation and eventual alignment;23 "each felt betrayed 
by the role that the others had played in the past, and 
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each felt the tug of ambitions in an uncertain future."24 
The most important aspect of these failed negotiations 
between the northern and southern proto-Contra forces was 
that the lack of agreement eventually led to formation of 
ARDE. 2 5 
As the north-south Contra negotiations proved 
fruitless, many in the Nicaraguan exile community were 
questioning Cardenal's leadership role in FDN politics. 
Furthermore, El Chicano's relationship with the former 
members of the GN as well as with the Argentines remained 
problematic. In spite of Cardenal's direct contact with the 
CIA through Agent John Perham, the CIA was unable to save 
Cardenal from the FDN's committee in Miami. The committee 
ousted Cardenal from the FDN political directorate and by 
1983 the CIA had also withdrawn its support from Cardenal. 
The CIA's rationale behind cutting off Cardenal's support 
was based on US Congressional criticism and the general 
negative publicity that was beginning to develop among the 
US populace regarding Contra funding. Lacking both FDN and 
CIA support, Cardenal retired from politics and sold 
insurance in Miami. 2 6 Whereas Cardenal was edged out of 
participation in Nicaraguan exile politics, the Chamorro 
brothers—at least for the time being—were able to adapt 
to the de jour politics of the proto-Contra phase, move 
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south, and survive to fight another day. 
MDN (Democratic Nicaraguan Movement) 
The political life of Alfonso Robelo has moved 
through a variety of Nicaraguan political circles as an 
anti-Somocista, a Sandinista, and an anti-Sandinista. 
Robelo first became involved in opposition politics against 
Somoza in 1974 through his business/political organization 
COSIP (Consejo Superior de la Iniciativa Privada). COSIP, 
under Robelo ,s direction, functioned as a major, more 
moderate opposition force to the Somoza regime prior to the 
assassination of opposition leader and newspaper publisher 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in January 1978. In March 1978, 
Robelo organized the social democratic MDN; in the summer 
of 1978, several groups—including the MDN—organized to 
form the Broad Opposition Front. The efforts of the 
moderate opposition to Somoza—including the M D N — always 
seemed to be out-maneuvered by the FSLN forces. When the 
FSLN forces saw the inevitability of their victory, the 
Provisional Government Junta of National Reconstruction 
(GRN) was announced on June 16, 1979 in San Jose; Robelo 
was named as one of its five members. 2 7 
By the spring of 1980, power within the FSLN 
government was clearly shifting away from the moderate 
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positions in the GRN as represented by Robelo and Violeta 
Chamorro and toward the FSLN's National Directorate (DNC) 
and Sandinista-dominant organizations. This power shift is 
best exemplified by the crisis that occurred regarding the 
semilegislative Council of State. The original plan for the 
Council of State was drawn up by the DNC in June 1979. 
Within this configuration the FSLN would have occupied only 
13 of the 33 seats with the remainder being apportioned 
among a broad cross-section of organizations. However, 
instead of being forced to compete with parties and 
organizations which had already accepted FSLN leadership in 
post-Somoza Nicaragua, the DNC merely expanded the number 
of Council seats to 47 with the new seats going to FSLN-
dominated or FSLN-associated organizations. These FSLN 
political maneuvers, combined with the reported 
nationalization of the Nicaraguan banks, were the prime 
motivational factors behind Robelo's resignation from the 
GRN in April 1980; citing poor health, Violeta Chamorro 
resigned a matter of days prior to Robelo. 2 8 
Throughout late 1980, Robelo and the MDN sharpened 
their public criticism of the FSLN. The FSLN responded in 
early November 1980 when the Interior Ministry declared 
that an MDN rally scheduled to take place in the town of 
Nandaime was classified as "political proselytizing" and 
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was therefore prohibited. The tension generated between the 
MDN and the FSLN was further exacerbated by decree 511 
which prohibited the publication of the events surrounding 
the FSLN's intervention in the Nandaime rally. The 
situation reached a point of culmination when young MDN 
supporters clashed with a group of FSLN youths, turbas, in 
Managua; by the end of the week, four MDN youths were 
arrested and the MDN headquarters were ransacked.29 
Throughout 1981, Robelo found political life as an 
opposition leader in the FSLN's Nicaragua to be rather 
difficult. Militant FSLN youths, the turbas, continued to 
harass Robelo and the MDN. Turbas once again wrecked the 
MDN building in Managua and attacked Robelo's home as well. 
Furthermore, Robelo sensed that the Reagan administration 
was working to settle the issues in Nicaragua on its own 
terms. He was likewise frustrated with the "Liberal 
Democrats" in Washington for what he saw as either their 
inability or their ineffectiveness in supporting such 
advocates of genuine pluralism within Nicaragua as himself. 
Therefore, Robelo and the entire MDN structure left Managua 
as voluntary exiles in March 1982; some went to Honduras 
but most went to Costa Rica. 3 0 
Even prior to the formal announcement of the 
33 
formation of ARDE in September 1982, Robelo and the MDN 
were clearly throwing their support behind Pastora. 
Comandante Cero had surfaced in San Jose to lambaste the 
DNC in his formal break with the FSLN only a month after 
Robelo left Managua. By summer 1982, "the MDN announced 
suspensions of all civic activities in Nicaragua and called 
upon its members and supporters within the country to aid 
Pastora."31 Additionally, it was no longer a secret that 
Pastora, Robelo, and the Nicaraguan ambassador to the 
United States, Arturo Cruz, Sr., were involved in an 
alliance. 3 2 Six months following his departure from 
Managua, Robelo and the MND joined with the others to form 
ARDE. 
FRS (Sandino Revolutionary Front) 
The charismatic Ed£n Pastora, Comandante Cero, was 
not only the "star"33 of the anti-Somoza insurgency and the 
leader of his own proto-Contra group; Pastora was the most 
prominent figure in the SOF. The course of Comandante 
Cero's political/military life mirrored that of many of the 
other Contras: anti-Somocista, Sandinista, anti-Sandinista. 
Pastora was already bent on vengeance toward the 
Somocista structure as his own father was killed by GN 
thugs when Eden was just seven years old. Furthermore, 
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classmates at the Jesuit Colegio Centroamerica in Granada 
noted that Pastora was perhaps resentful about the fact 
that he lacked the pedigree of some of the Nicaraguan 
"imperial" families. His last name was not as prominent as 
Chamorro and he came from the "poor side" of the Pastora 
family. This same vengeance aimed at the Somocista 
structure served as the catalyst for Pastora's withdrawal 
from medical school in Mexico in 1959. Upon his return to 
Nicaragua, Pastora joined one of the many seminal anti-
Somoza groups—the Sandino Revolutionary Front. Pastora 
circulated among the various anti-Somoza groups until 1961 
when he began his association with the FSLN.34 
Antagonism was a fact of life among the FSLN leaders 
in the 1960s and the early 1970s as different theories and 
the individual personalities that espoused them often 
clashed. Pastora and Tomas Borge were both strong 
personalities and they each perceived the other as lacking 
the genuine character traits of a revolutionary leader. 
Pastora thought of Borge as a cafe revolutionary who was 
more of a theoretician than a fighter. It was perhaps 
Borge, conversely, who blocked Pastora's visit to Cuba in 
the late 1960s after Borge advised Fidel Castro that 
Pastora was a social democrat and not a committed marxist. 
The Somocista crackdown on the FSLN following the 1967 
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Nicaraguan election landed several of the Front's leaders 
in prison and severely demoralized the FSLN. The FSLN did 
not recover until the 1974 Christmas Party raid. Pastora 
was a target of the resentment of some of the FSLN leaders 
as he was not scorched by the baptismal fires of the 
revolutionary: prison, torture, and day to day involvement 
in the struggle. Instead, Pastora was in Mexico, the United 
States, Italy, and Switzerland. Then Pastora grew tobacco 
in Nicaragua after accepting an amnesty from the Somoza 
government. Finally, in 1973—after an Mon again-off again" 
commitment to the life of the mythical "revolutionary in 
the mountains"—Pastora became a fisherman in the Barra del 
Colorado region of Costa Rica. It was here that Sergio 
Ramirez and Carlos Coronel found Pastora in 1977 and 
offered him the opportunity to participate again in the 
insurgency. Daniel and Humberto Ortega were in San Jos6, 
according to the envoys, and they were approaching the 
revolution from a different angle; the tercerista faction 
would broaden the insurgency 7s base by including the groups 
and individuals who had previously been alienated by the 
FSLN /s factionalized marxist dogma.35 
Pastora first mentioned his vision of the raid on the 
National Palace—the meeting venue of Nicaragua's congress 
as well as the offices of several of Nicaragua's government 
agencies—to others in the FSLN in 1970. The successful 
execution of the raid's plans were primarily contingent 
upon deceiving the GN security forces at the National 
Palace and convincing them that a surprise visit by Somoza 
was in the offing. In August 1978, Pastora's assault team 
commanded the National Palace within three minutes of 
entering the building; the FSLN team suffered no 
casualties. Following a couple of days of negotiations, 
Somoza—fearing that Pastora was not bluffing about his 
threat to kill the 1,500 hostages that were held in the 
National Palace (including Somoza relatives)—agreed to 
release 59 political prisoners (including Tomas Borge) and 
grant the FSLN $500,000 in ransom. The National Palace raid 
was a brilliant ploy for several different reasons: 1) the 
FSLN claimed a much needed victory which served as the 
catalyst for greater popular rebellion in the following 
month; 2) the FSLN now had a hero with Pastora; 3) the raid 
was planned to coincide with as well as upset a GN-planned 
coup against Somoza which further diminished the Somocismo 
sin Somoza option vis-a-vis the Nicaraguan populace; and 4) 
Pastora's nationalist-populist ideology gained wide support 
among the region's social democrats which translated into 
support for the FSLN.36 
Following the National Palace raid, the FSLN's DNC 
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was concerned about the possibility of a personality cult 
developing around Pastora. Therefore, Pastora was named as 
the commander of the FSLN 7s southern front where he would 
remain visible enough to garner outside support for the 
FSLN's insurgency while remaining out of the thick of the 
battle which was centered in and around Managua. In a 
sense, Pastora was used as a decoy to attract the bulk of 
the GN forces to the south while the more hardline FSLN 
forces were primed to take Managua; the DNC wanted to 
neutralize Pastora's "power quotient." Pastora was keenly 
aware of the jockeying for power that was occurring. In 
fact, Pastora sent a letter to Washington via former Costa 
Rican President Jose Figueres in which he tried to convince 
the Carter administration to convince Somoza to withdraw 
the GN forces in the south so that Pastora could advance to 
Managua unimpeded and thus prevent the outright victory by 
more radical FSLN forces. The Carter administration, 
however, still believed it could influence events more 
directly and establish a non-FSLN government. The DNC's 
plan to neutralize Pastora was indeed successful. As FSLN 
fighters arrived in Managua on July 19, 1979, Comandante 
Cero was still engaged in battle with sparse GN forces in 
the south. 3 7 
Following the FSLN victory, Pastora's role in the 
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revolutionary government was vaguely defined and, over a 
period of time, "as Pastora was neglected, his doubts about 
the revolution began to grow. Socialism seemed to be on the 
wane, communism on the rise." 3 8 In spite of his popularity 
and his contribution to the revolution, Pastora was never 
included in the DNC. Instead, Pastora was first named as 
deputy interior minister under Tomas Borge and then later 
named as deputy defense minister and commander of the 
militia under Humberto Ortega. A combination of Pastora's 
perception of the consolidation of the revolution and its 
drift to the left as well as the simple fact that he was 
excluded from the upper reaches of power in the FSLN 
government motivated Comandante Cero and nine of his 
supporters to leave Nicaragua in early July 1981. 3 9 He left 
behind a letter to Humberto Ortega that vaguely outlined 
his plans: 
I am going to discharge my revolutionary 
gunpowder against the oppressor in whatever 
part of the world in which he is found, 
without it mattering whether they call me 
Quixote or Sancho.40 
Much like the 1960s and early 1970s, Pastora found 
himself playing the role of the transient romantic 
revolutionary. Pastora's first stop was Panama where he met 
with his political idol and mentor General Omar Torrijos. 
To all outward appearances, it seemed that Pastora actually 
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did want to assist other revolutionary struggles. He hoped 
•to enlist the support of Torrijos and Venezuelan President 
Carlos Andres Perez in helping the Revolutionary 
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) of Guatemala 
which had an ideology quite similar to the tercerista 
philosophy. Comandante Cero's hopes, however, were dashed 
by Torrijos' death in a small plane crash only a few weeks 
after Pastora had arrived in Panama. 
Pastora went next to Havana; then to Libya via 
Algeria where Colonel Muammar Qadhafi contributed at least 
$3 million to ORPA. His next stop was back to Havana where 
he was held under house arrest while Castro tried to coax 
him back into the FSLN fold and until Torrijos' son 
intervened on his behalf. Pastora's next destination was 
southern California where he met with CIA-connected arms 
dealers. Finally, in early 1982, Pastora met with CIA Latin 
American division chief Duane "Dewey" Clarridge at a posh 
hotel in Acapulco, Mexico. 4 1 
In spite of the fact that Pastora and Clarridge were 
almost instant friends, the two had different plans for the 
political struggles of Central America. Rather than Pastora 
receiving support for ORPA from the CIA, Clarridge and 
Pastora agreed that a Contra Southern Front should be 
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opened. It was Pastora who set most of the terms: a) 
Pastora ,s FRS would hold to the tercerista line; b) Pastora 
would maintain autonomy over the FRS; c) there would be no 
FRS-FDN alliance; d) the FRS would outwardly be involved in 
political protests while covertly the FRS would train anti-
FSLN fighters in Costa Rica; and e) the CIA involvement in 
military operations had to remain secret. Furthermore, the 
agreement established the CIA as the major financial 
contributor to the SOF until the 1984 La Penca bombing. The 
deal struck between Clarridge and Pastora was more or less 
sealed by Pastora's April 15, 1982 news conference in San 
Jose when he made his public break with the FSLN. 4 2 
A short time following the April news conference, 
Pastora was back on the road again. Comandante Cero greeted 
seventeen FSLN deserters on the Costa Rican side of its 
border with Nicaragua. The small ceremony at the border 
looked to many as a violation of Costa Rican exile/military 
law. Pastora was expelled and went first to Europe to 
solicit political as well as financial support from 
socially democratic organizations. Pastora then travelled 
to Honduras for negotiations with Honduran General Gustavo 
Alvarez concerning a Contra unity force. The presence of 
former Somocista guardsmen in the Honduran-based FDN and 
the personality clash between Pastora and Alvarez impeded 
41 
any chance of Contra unity. The meeting in Honduras sowed 
the seeds of doubt among the FDN, the Hondurans, and some 
in the CIA concerning Pastora's personal stability as a 
leader.43 
In spite of the US Defence Intelligence Agency report 
that predicted the formation of ARDE in the summer of 1982, 
Pastora resigned in protest to an FDN assault on a village 
in northern Nicaragua in which some of their prisoners were 
killed and the FRS was wrongly implicated in the incident 
by the FDN force. Pastora, however, then met with Costa 
Rican President Luis Alberto Monge and agreed to live 
within Costa Rican exile law if he were allowed to return. 
A month following his meeting with Monge, Pastora and the 
three other members of the ARDE team announced the 
formation of their alliance. 4 4 
MISURASATA (Miskitos, Sumos, and Ramas) 
MISURASATA was an alliance of the Miskito, Sumo, and 
Rama indigenous groups and the Creoles, all of the Atlantic 
coast region of Nicaragua. The Atlantic coast of Nicaragua 
is an interesting amalgamation of a more British historical 
legacy, diverse ethnic groups, Protestant rather than 
Catholic religious orientation, and a swampy lowland 
geography that isolates the Atlantic region from the more 
Spanish-dominated Pacific side of Nicaragua. 4 5 
The Somozas approached the Atlantic coast region, for 
the most part, with a non-interventionist agenda. The 
costefios responded without the same hatred and resentment 
that was rampant in Pacific Nicaragua as the GN presence on 
the Atlantic coast never acted with the same brutality. 
Therefore, the anti-Somoza insurgency of the late 1970s 
"was almost a foreign news story to people in Bluefields 
and Puerto Cabezas." 4 6 
Only a few months after the FSLN assumed power, a 
group of five hundred Indians attended a convention in 
Puerto Cabezas with the intention of forming an ethnic-
based political organization. In spite of the FSLN's 
efforts to assimilate the Indians into Sandinista "mass 
organizations," the Indians formed MISURASATA and named 
Miskito Steadman Fagoth as its leader. The FSLN reluctantly 
awarded Fagoth a seat on the Council of State as the 
representative of the indigenous organization. The 
convention and the assertive attitude of MISURASATA was a 
harbinger of the growing conflict between the costefios and 
the "Spanish" FSLN of Managua. 4 7 
The FSLN lacked a clear understanding of the 
43 
situation on the Atlantic coast. The revolutionary agenda 
that the FSLN was implementing throughout Nicaragua was 
most resisted on the Atlantic coast. The Cuban presence in 
Zalaya province was, according to the costefios, unwanted. 
Furthermore, the FSLN failed to understand that the 
friction that existed between the FSLN and the costefios was 
motivated more by a sense of indigenismo among the groups 
of MISURASATA than by socio-political counterrevolution. 
Whereas Fagoth wanted FSLN assurances that the Miskitos 
could continue their traditional system of communally 
controlled land ownership, the FSLN considered the region 
to be socially backward as the Miskitos were, in essence, 
without a sense of class awareness. The FSLN was clearly 
upset as the Miskitos saw no class distinction when class 
distinction and class struggle, theoretically speaking, 
should have served as the foundation of the proletarian 
state. 4 8 
After withdrawing MISURASATA from the Council of 
State in early 1981 as a general protest to the FSLN's 
inattentiveness to Miskito demands, Fagoth and thirty other 
Miskitos were arrested as tensions between MISURASATA and 
the FSLN mounted. The FSLN charged that Fagoth was not only 
involved in counterrevolutionary activity but that he was 
a Somocista informer. Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, and others 
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were likewise charged as members of an Atlantic coast 
separatist movement. Upon Fagoth's release, he fled to 
Honduras and Brooklyn Rivera took over the leadership of 
the banned MISURASATA. 4 9 
In November 1981, Miskito forces who had fled to 
Honduras returned to Nicaragua—under the command of 
Fagoth—and launched the "Red Christmas" offensive. Author 
Martha Honey states that the attacks were a CIA sponsored 
attempt on the part of the Contras to seize a piece of 
Nicaraguan territory and declare it "liberated" and seek 
recognition from the United States and other friendly 
governments. 5 0 While the FSLN counter-offensive sent ten 
thousand Miskitos to the refugee camps in Honduras, the 
relatively meager CIA assistance in "Red Christmas" created 
first a power struggle and then a schism within the Miskito 
proto-Contras. In February 1982, Rivera was asked to leave 
Honduras; in June 1982, he was expelled from Honduras and 
went to Costa Rica. Fagoth remained in Honduras and formed 
the FDN-aligned Miskito group MISURA. Brooklyn Rivera and 
some of his followers reconstituted MISURASATA and became 
part of ARDE three months later.51 
The SOF Alliance: September 1982-May 1984 
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On September 24, 1982 in San Jose, Costa Rica, 
Pastora of the FRS, Robelo of the MDN, El Negro of 
UDN/FARN, and Rivera of MISURASATA formally announced the 
formation of ARDE (Revolutionary Democratic Alliance) . ARDE 
pledged that each group would "preserve its identity but 
coordinate its efforts, and invite all who are dedicated to 
restoring the original goals of the Nicaraguan revolution 
to join them." 5 2 The time period of the SOF alliance spans 
from the formation of ARDE until the La Penca bombing that 
targeted Pastora in 1984. 
In 1983, ARDE experienced its first significant 
addition as well as its first significant departure. In 
early 1983, "El Negro" was encountering trouble from all 
quarters. Chamorro reportedly left ARDE out of frustration 
with what he perceived as the alliance's passive approach 
to the FSLN. The other ARDE leaders feared that "El Negro" 
not only brought a Somocista-tinged past into their 
alliance but his military tactics—basically hit and run 
border raids—were drawing negative attention to ARDE from 
the Costa Rican authorities. It was of little consequence 
as to whether Chamorro was pushed out or whether he left; 
"El Negro" was expelled from Costa Rica for arms 
trafficking and went to Honduras to fight with the FDN. 5 3 
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Also in early 1983, Jose Davila and his group, the 
FSDC (Christian Democratic Solidarity Front), joined ARDE. 
Davila was previously associated with ANUDE (Nicaraguan 
Assembly of Democratic Unity), a center-left political 
organization that worked for ARDE-FDN unity. Perhaps more 
important to the SOF was who Davila knew. Davila had 
received a scholarship to study in West Germany from the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a political organization that 
was associated with the West German Christian Democratic 
Party. Whereas Davila denied receiving any funds from the 
foundation, Robelo admitted that ARDE had received money 
from the German Christian Democratic Party and did not rule 
out the involvement of the foundation. 5 4 This was only one 
of the funding sources for the SOF alliance. 
Operation Tipped Kettle, Operation Tipped Kettle II, 
and Project Elephant Herd were all plans devised by the CIA 
and implemented with the cooperation of the US Department 
of Defense (DoD) , the CIA, and the Israeli military. The 
DoD approached the Israelis concerning the possibility of 
them "granting" captured PLO weapons to the CIA for 
operational use. Operation Tipped Kettle was the result of 
the first negotiations in May 1983; Tipped Kettle II was 
the result of the DoD "returning to the well" in February 
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1984. Project Elephant Herd was a method for storing the 
Israeli-granted weapons for later distribution when the 
covert operations were forced to stay within US 
Congressional funding limitations. 5 5 The Contra leaders 
from both the Northern and Southern Fronts estimated that 
during 1983 alone they received 6000 Israeli supplied 
weapons. For the SOF—Pastora, in particular—the Israeli 
weapons carried a certain price tag. In October 1983, the 
CIA reportedly halted the shipments of the captured PLO 
weapons in an attempt to move Pastora toward unity with the 
FDN. 5 6 
Whereas ARDE issued its official "call to arms" in 
April 1983 and launched its first military operation two 
weeks later against the town of El Castillo Vie jo, the most 
important military operations of the SOF alliance—in terms 
of political significance—were the series of late 1983 
and early 1984 attacks in which ARDE played only a limited 
role. For many of these operations, the CIA used its own 
force of "unilaterally controlled Latino assets" (UCLA) . In 
early 1984, UCLA teams deposited mines in the major 
Nicaraguan ports on both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. 
Alfonso Robelo—following CIA instructions—told the press 
that ARDE was responsible for the mining of two of the 
harbors. The political significance of the mining operation 
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was two-fold: a) it demonstrated the degree of CIA 
involvement in the SOF—in spite of several statements of 
denial from ARDE; and b) the mining incident proved to be 
a rallying point for US congressional opposition to the 
Reagan administration's policies in Central America. 5 7 
By the end of 1983, it appeared that a "palace coup" 
was developing within ARDE over the issue of Contra 
unification. Not long after the formation of ARDE, it 
became evident that Alfonso Robelo was the alliance's 
advocate for unity with the FDN. In late 1983, "Robelo sent 
some of his loyalists to Honduras for military training 
under CIA/FDN auspices, a move which greatly angered 
Pastora." 5 8 Another sign of organizational instability 
appeared within ARDE in early 1984 when "El Negro" returned 
to the alliance with his UND/FARN forces and sided with 
Robelo's pro-unity faction. Just prior to the La Penca 
bombing, Robelo officially broke with Pastora. 5 9 
The Divided SOF: June 1984-September 1986 
Whereas the SOF alliance was on the decline prior to 
the bombing at La Penca, the bombing was clearly the 
watershed event for all of the participants along the 
Southern Front. The La Penca bombing—for the forces of the 
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SOF—marked the end of one operational methodology and the 
beginning of another: the United States was abandoning its 
goal of creating a "Honduras South" in Costa Rica and 
opting instead for the eventual creation of a small "dirty 
tricks" network. 6 0 Either not all of the SOF Contras were 
aware of this paradigm shift or they chose to ignore it. 
The time period of the divided SOF alliance was 
characterized by several short-lived, shifting alliances 
and the eventual dismantling of the mainstream SOF 
structure. 
Pastora had arranged to hold a news conference to 
address the issues concerning the dissolution of ARDE; the 
news conference was scheduled for May 30 on the Nicaraguan 
side of the San Juan River. The journey to the remote La 
Penca camp was a six hour adventure. Of the twenty to 
twenty-five journalists that attended, a supposed Danish 
photographer named Per Anker Hansen placed a camera box on 
the floor near where Pastora was busy basking in the light 
of the flashing cameras. A few minutes later, the bomb 
exploded, killing four and wounding eighteen—including 
Pastora. "Pastora immediately blamed the CIA for the 
bombing. US and Costa Rican officials blamed the Nicaraguan 
government."61 Author Martha Honey—whose husband, Tony 
Avirgan was present at La Penca—claims that several 
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different individuals and organizations had a vested 
interest in seeing the demise of Comandante Cero.62 
Finally, after an intensive and mystery-shrouded 
investigation. Honey and Avirgan concluded that the bomber 
known as Per Anker Hansen was actually Argentine leftist 
Vital Roberto Gaguine who worked with the FSLN's Interior 
Ministry in the 1980s. 6 3 
In less than two months following the La Penca 
bombing, Robelo and FDN leader Adolfo Calero signed the 
Panama Pact in Panama which united the two groups under the 
name UNIR (Nicaraguans United for Reconciliation). "El 
Negro" replaced Pastora and was named as armed forces 
general commander of the ARDE forces that followed Robelo. 
Pastora would presumably continue his anti-Sandinista 
activities with his followers which included Brooklyn 
Rivera and Jose Davila. The two primary objectives of UNIR 
were indeed to unify the Contras of the North and South as 
well as isolate Pastora and Rivera's MISURASATA. As Oliver 
North and John Hull both supported UNIR, Robelo's ARDE 
faction that accepted unification and consistent CIA 
funding became known as "rich ARDE." Pastora's faction was 
now without the CIA's checkbook and was referred to as 
"poor ARDE." 6 4 
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Within seven months of the La Penca bombing, Brooklyn 
Rivera was starting to make overtures toward Managua. Like 
Pastora, Rivera's support from the CIA had dried up as a 
result of choosing sides on the Contra unity issue. In 
November, Rivera went to Honduras to meet with 
representatives of the rival Miskito group MISURA. Less 
than a month later, Rivera was negotiating with the FSLN. 
The FSLN made it clear that they were willing to talk to 
Rivera but not with the FDN or ARDE; the CIA and the FDN 
were, of course, upset. In early 1985, Rivera issued a 
press statement that defined the struggle between the FSLN 
and MISURASATA as a conflict about ethnicity. Furthermore, 
he lashed out at all the Contra groups. Oliver North's 
response was to offer Rivera $100,000 for food, clothing, 
medical supplies, and munitions in exchange for Rivera to 
halt his negotiations with the Sandinistas. Rivera took the 
deal. Later on in 1985, Oliver North and Rob Owen were 
behind the creation of KISAN (Coast Indians All Unite in 
Nicaragua) as a means of side-stepping Rivera.65 
The UNIR combination of Robelo and Calero lasted less 
than six months until it was replaced by the Robelo, 
Calero, and Arturo Cruz alliance of UNO (United Nicaraguan 
Opposition). UNO was yet another US-created alliance that 
attempted to bring together the Contra forces of the North 
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and South. UNO—like many of the other Contra umbrellas— 
was rife with internal conflict as Robelo and Cruz often 
stood on the opposite side of the issues compared to the 
more conservative Calero. In March 1985, the three leaders 
of UNO joined with other Contra leaders in San Jose in a 
show of unity which also called on the FSLN to make 
sweeping as well as unreasonable reforms. The Contra 
gathering had more to do with winning US congressional 
votes than it did with demonstrating a sense of unity. Of 
the seven prominent Contra leaders in attendance, Pastora 
was not among them. 6 6 
In response to the San Jose Declaration, Pastora and 
Alfredo Cesar—former president of the Nicaraguan Central 
Bank from 1980-1982—formed BOS (Southern Opposition Bloc) 
in mid-1985. BOS was originally composed of five social 
democratic political organizations and non-FSLN trade 
unions. In spite of claiming to be an independent movement 
supported by the Socialist International, BOS received most 
of its funds from the CIA.67 
In 1986, "El Negro" Chamorro's fortunes as well as the 
fortunes of FARN took a serious turn toward the worst. 
After the initiatives implemented by Lt. Col. Oliver North 
and the CIA regarding the SOF had achieved the objective of 
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removing Pastora from the SOF battlefield, the CIA once 
again asked Chamorro to play an important military role 
along the Southern Front. At that time, however, the 
momentum was already building behind North's grand plans 
for the SOF which included the general dismantling of the 
conventional structure of the SOF. Largely as a result the 
North-CIA attrition measures, FARN forces numbered less 
than twenty in mid-1986.68 
Pastora's political and military fortunes likewise 
took a dive in mid-1986. Some of Pastora's long-time allies 
accepted money from the CIA in exchange for casting their 
lots behind Chamorro and FARN. Pastora finally did retire 
in May 1986 and returned to the Costa Rican Pacific coast 
to resume the fishing business from which he was called 
away nine years previously.69 
The SOF End Game: September 1986-January 1988 
In mid September 1986, Costa Rican President Oscar 
Arias ordered the closing of the Santa Elena airstrip. Less 
than one month later, Eugene Hasenfus was shot down over 
Nicaragua which put an end to the covert resupply effort.70 
As the Southern Front of the Contra War was "winding down,11 
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most of the leaders of the SOF either retired from the 
political-military arena or they rejoined Nicaraguan 
politics within the legal framework. 
Pastora, as was mentioned earlier, returned to 
fishing on the Pacific coast. In 1987, Fernando Chamorro 
resigned from UDN/FARN, accepted the FSLN's amnesty offer 
and returned to Managua where he worked with Nicaragua's 
traditional Conservative Party. Following the electoral 
victory of Violeta Chamorro in 1990, Brooklyn Rivera worked 
closely with the Chamorro administration concerning 
Atlantic coast matters. In January 1988, President Arias 
issued orders to have Robelo—as well as others—to be 
expelled if they failed to comply with the Central American 
Peace Plan. Robelo remained in Costa Rica and indirectly 
assisted with Violeta Chamorro's campaign.71 
Summary 
When one observes the four basic phases of the SOF, 
it seems somewhat ironic that the SOF spent more of its 
time being an alliance of factions than an alliance of 
unity. The chronology of the SOF is, therefore, an account 
of competing interests and competing personalities. The 
various points of contention seem to converge at the 
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interrelated issue of unity with the FDN forces and the 
conditional nature of CIA support; it was this larger issue 
that facilitated the schisms within the SOF. Pastora's 
choice to divest himself from the Contra unification 
efforts and the CIA's eventual divestment of itself from 
Pastora in the first half of 1984 set the stage for the 
remainder of the Contra War along the southern front— 
including the role of the Santa Elena airstrip in the Iran-
Contra affair. The divisive nature of the entire Contra 
unity issue was not the only factor that contributed to the 
failure of the SOF; it was, however, the most significant 
factor as it facilitated the shift away from the 
conventional SOF forces to the North-CIA plan. 
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CHAPTER III 
WHY THE SOF CONTRAS ? 
Several factors were involved in the formation of the 
Contras. As counterrevolution is in many aspects the 
flipped-side of the "revolutionary coin," we will first 
examine the macro-political characteristics of 
counterrevolutionary activity by reviewing some of the 
principles of revolution in the Collapsible Pyramid Model 
as presented by Jan Knippers Black. Whereas no model can 
serve as a panacea when dealing with the complexities of 
political development and process, the Collapsible Pyramid 
Model is applicable to the revolution as well as the 
counterrevolution in Nicaragua. By asserting that 
counterrevolution is an organic consequence of the social 
revolutionary process, the SOF can be analyzied as a 
counterrevolutionary force responding to the movement of 
the FSLN through the revolutionary process. In this 
chapter, the study will offer a general description of the 
inherent characteristics of the revolutionary process at 
that particular phase. Then, within this same framework, we 
will observe if and how some of the policies of the 
Sandinista government, combined with the natural propensity 
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of the political process, served to solidify what was at 
first an opposition nuisance into a broader 
counterrevolutionary movement through the SOF. 1 Finally in 
this chapter we will see how the Contras were easily 
integrated into the more encompassing policy objectives of 
US foreign policy both globally and regionally throughout 
the decade of the 1980s. 
Counterrevolution as a consequence of political evolution 
and revolution: the case of post-Somoza Nicaragua 
In her chapter entitled "Participation and Political 
Process: The Collapsible Pyramid," Jan Knippers Black 
outlines the nature of political participation by social 
strata through the three-phased Collapsible Pyramid Model 
of Evolution, Revolution, and Counterrevolution.(Fig.1) 2 
Evolution Revolution Counterrevolut ion 
Political Participation by Social Strata: The Collapsible Pyramid 
Model 
Political evolution implies the incorporation of new 
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political actors, representing previously unrepresented 
social strata, without the displacement of previous 
participants in the system. Revolution is defined as the 
displacement or disestablishment of groups representing one 
or more strata from the upper reaches of the social 
pyramid. Our definition of counterrevolution is implied in 
that of revolution. It is the displacement, or elimination 
from effective participation, of groups representing strata 
from the base of the social pyramid.3 
The four principal phases of the revolutionary process— 1) 
power transfer, 2) redistribution, 3) institutionalization, 
and 4) reconcentration—may be vulnerable to the derailing 
forces of counterrevolution at any point and in varying 
degrees in their development. Counterrevolution is, 
therefore, a possible reaction to an incomplete revolution 
or the real or imagined fear of revolution. 4 The case of 
Nicaragua is of course unique according to its own set of 
circumstances. It should be noted at this time that 
Nicaragua has not undergone the thorough counterrevolution 
that was launched in Guatemala in 1954 when President 
Jacobo Arbenz was ousted by the CIA-backed forces of Carlos 
Castillo Armas. Given the definition above, it would be 
more accurate to state that —especially after 1 9 8 0 — 
Nicaragua was besieged by a host of opposition groups that 
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engaged in what will be referred to as counterrevolutionary 
activity. The nature and depth of counterrevolution that 
would have been undertaken by a group or groups of 
victorious Contras can be determined only through educated 
speculation. It is the purpose of this section, however, to 
review the available resources and draw some conclusions as 
to how the nature of the FSLN government and the nature of 
the revolutionary process contributed to the formation of 
the SOF as a counterrevolutionary movement. In this chapter 
which describes the revolutionary process, it will be noted 
that the factors that contributed to the formation of the 
SOF occurred in each phase of the process. In the 
redistribution phase of the Sandinista Revolution, many of 
the individuals and groups that would later constitute the 
nucleus of the SOF began to view some of the FSLN policies 
as contributing factors to their growing sense of 
disillusionment regarding the direction of the revolution. 
However, it was in the institutionalization phase of the 
FSLN revolutionary process that the individuals and the 
groups that they represented actually advanced out of the 
proto-Contra phase and formed the political and military 
components of the SOF. 
The power transfer phase is the first phase of the 
revolutionary process. In this phase the exit of the old 
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elite from the pyramid's apex is only a portion of the 
phase; the opposition groups may begin to express their 
disillusionment as "the affluent and the indigent, who 
might agree on the kind of government they do not want, 
cannot be expected to agree on the kind they want in its 
place. " 5 
In Nicaragua, the FSLN faced almost immediate 
opposition on two different fronts in the power transfer 
phase: a) representatives of the former elite, and b) 
groups and individuals—from both the right and the left of 
the political continuum—who helped oust Somoza yet did not 
favor FSLN governance. The National Guard (GN) acted on 
behalf of the economic-political elite, which when simply 
positioned, placed the GN clearly within the pre-FSLN 
status quo. 6 Additionally, the anti-Somoza business 
community could not successfully compete with the 
Sandinista-mobilized workers and peasants in the scramble 
to fill the power vacuum left by Somoza ,s departure. 
Whereas many individuals enthusiastically labored to bring 
down the Somoza dynasty, many of these same individuals— 
even in this first phase of the revolutionary process— 
began to find themselves alienated from the decision 
making; falling into the ranks of the developing 
counterrevolutionary struggle was but a short, additional 
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step. Even prior to the initiation of seemingly radical 
policies, some groups existed—including the seminal 
military elements of the SOF—that represented neither 
Somoza's GN nor the specific interests of the business 
community. 7 In overall terms of the formation of the SOF, 
however, the power transfer phase was not of great 
importance. This fact is evidenced by the actions of two of 
the eventual members of the SOF during this phase of the 
revolutionary process. 
Two of the more influential figures of the SOF, 
Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora, were active participants 
in the power transfer phase of the revolutionary process. 
Both men, however, operated from quite different stances 
within the FSLN. Over a period of three years, Robelo made 
a series of transitions ranging from anti-Somocista, to 
FSLN junta member, to anti-Sandinista. On June 17, 1979, 
Robelo was named to the Government of National 
Reconstruction (GRN) and was recognized—along with Violeta 
Chamorro—by Carter Administration policymakers as a 
moderate among a field of influential leftists.8 Robelo 
served as part of the GRN until he resigned in April 1980 
in protest of what he saw as FSLN political manipulation. 
He moved to Costa Rica in 1982 where he joined with 
Pastora, who had defected from the FSLN government in the 
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summer of 1981, to form a "political-military alliance" in 
opposition to the FSLN. 9 
Like Robelo, Eden Pastora played a key role in the 
power transfer phase. Some of the long-time FSLN members 
held Pastora in contempt as he was perceived by some as 
having a propensity to be absent from many of the key 
events in the evolution of the FSLN. For his battlefield 
success against Somoza—particularly Operation Pigpen— and 
its accompanying popularity, Pastora was awarded the 
position of Vice Minister of Defense serving under Tomas 
Borge and was also named as the Commander of the Militia. 
Pastora, however, was soon disaffected and likewise left 
the government in July 1981; his departure was shrouded in 
high-level political mystery. 1 0 The important aspect of the 
power transfer phase in terms of the formation of the SOF 
was that during this phase these two leading figures 
clearly were more sympathetic with the incoming FSLN 
government than with the outgoing Somocistas; the same 
cannot be said of the "other Contras" in Honduras or Miami. 
Throughout the revolutionary phase of economic and 
power redistribution, counterrevolutionary elements may 
raise serious objections as to how the spoils of the 
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departed elite are managed. The top of the pyramid in 
Nicaragua consisted of Somoza, his relatives, close 
associates, the weakened Partido Liberal Nacional (PLN), 
the GN, and—stabilizing the top of the pyramid from behind 
the scenes—the US. 1 1 The resources that were available for 
redistribution were the political and economic holdings of 
these former tenants of the upper segment. In mid-1979, 
estimates hinted that the confiscated properties of Somoza 
would amount to as much as 50 percent of all of the 
country's productive facilities.12 The agriculture 
structure was, therefore, a major focus of the FSLN's 
economic redistribution efforts. 
The economic redistribution process can be seen in 
the agrarian reforms initiated by the FSLN's GRN. The 
agrarian reform program was somewhat paradoxical. On one 
hand the confiscation of fincas was, generally speaking, a 
thorough and proportionally equitable undertaking (Tables 
la and lb) 1 3 yet six years following the creation of the 
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management of individual producers. 1 4 In spite of the fact 
that the majority of the land holdings remained privatized, 
opposition developed regarding not so much over the issue 
of land confiscation but its consolidation into 
cooperatives rather than redistribution for greater private 
ownership. 1 5 Four and one-half years following the 
initiation of the agrarian reform laws, private 
business/agriculture opposition leaders within Nicaragua 
still bemoaned the FSLN's heavy hand in the agricultural 
economy and continued to criticize what they perceived as 
the FSLN's course toward Communism. 1 6 
Minister of Agriculture Jaime Wheelock did indeed 
distribute confiscated lands (Somocista land as well as 
property that had not belonged either to the Somozas or to 
their associates) to campesinos on state farms and to some 
individuals. These properties were most likely either 
inefficiently operated large farm holdings or lands 
confiscated from the FSLN's opponents. 1 7 Evidence indicates 
that as both the Northern and Southern front Contras 
escalated their campaigns against the government in Managua 
in 1983 and 1984 that the issue of land expropriation and 
redistribution added combatants to the Contra ranks while 
facilitating shifts in the FSLN's agrarian reform 
policies. 1 8 During the redistribution phase of the 
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revolutionary process, the issue of state versus private 
land redistribution and the agrarian reform program in 
general, was no doubt a point of debate among those who 
ended up on the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border or in San 
Jose. However, as for the actual formation of the SOF, the 
opposition generated by this issue did not drive thousands 
of hacendados, agri-businessmen, or marginalized middle-
class campesinos into Costa Rica. Successful, large-scale 
farmers who operated on the sixty-one percent of the 
private land served the goals of the FSLN in two ways: a) 
they reinforced the FSLN's claim that it advocated a mixed 
economy, and b) through the export of some crops, they were 
able to contribute to the national economy in ways that 
smaller producers would have been inefficient.19 On the 
other hand, by distributing some land to campesinos in the 
Contra War zones, the FSLN was able to undermine some of 
the Contra support in those regions; agrarian reform, 
therefore, became a counter-insurgency weapon used by the 
Sandinista government. 
In the institutionalization phase of the 
revolutionary process, many administrative and legal 
concerns will be addressed by the new government. Many new 
political support groups may emerge on the scene and mass 
organizations may now assume a more defined role. The new 
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regime may also initiate new laws and draft new 
constitutions during this phase of the process as the 
neophytes wish to outline for the populace—both friend and 
foe—the basic parameters of the revolutionary government. 
The ultimate goal for the new regime in the institutional 
phase is to develop and successfully utilize "a mechanism 
for regulating succession to power" and to be assured that 
it is "functioning more or less smoothly." 2 0 It is during 
this phase that most of the motivating factors for the 
formation of the SOF emerged. In this section we will 
examine an important situation that demonstrated how the 
FSLN-initiated institutionalization policies served as the 
partial yet significant impetus for the formation of the 
SOF. The 1984 Nicaraguan elections could be cited as an 
example of the FSLN's efforts toward institutionalization. 
Prior to these elections, however, was the FSLN's 
successful effort to establish the foundation of the 
institutionalization process by first maneuvering the FSLN 
party into the role of the nation's hegemonic political 
force. 
Those who would truly hold power in post-Somoza 
Nicaragua rose to the surface in early 1979; the three 
factions of the FSLN were unified under the name National 
Directorate (Direcci6n Nacional Conjunta—DNC) . The DNC not 
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only set the terms for the remainder of the insurgency 
phase but would also be the supreme governing body in the 
new Nicaragua. Journalist Clifford Krauss asserts that the 
Sandinistas simultaneously displayed two vastly different 
faces of the same victorious insurgency: the pluralist 
government of the five-member junta (GRN) and the 
Sandinista-Leninist D N C 2 1 To further complicate the post-
Somoza power equation, the Council of State was formed in 
Costa Rica in June 1979. The FSLN gradually established its 
dominance over both the GRN and the Council of State. The 
resulting fallout from the FSLN's consolidation of power 
was the eventual exile of some of the future leaders of the 
SOF. 
The original GRN included bourgeois moderates Alfonso 
Robelo and Violeta Chamorro, Tercerista Daniel Ortega, Los 
Doce member Sergio Ramirez, and leftist Moises Hassan. 
Citing bad health, Chamorro resigned in April 1980; Robelo, 
upset with the FSLN takeover of the Council of State, 
tendered his resignation shortly thereafter. Los Doce 
member Arturo Cruz and Supreme Court Justice Rafael C6rdoba 
Rivas replaced the two moderates. By mid-1981, however, the 
GRN was reduced to three members which left C6rdoba as the 
only remaining non-Sandinista. 2 2 
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The original agreement for the Council of State 
stipulated that the FSLN would occupy thirteen of the 
thirty-three seats. To allow for the representation of many 
of the newly formed mass organizations, however, the 
membership of the Council was expanded to forty-seven; the 
fourteen new seats were given either to FSLN members or to 
FSLN supporters from the leftist Patriotic Revolutionary 
Front and the mass organizations, when in late 1980, COSEP-
-the expanded and renamed COSIP—and Robelo's MDN protested 
against the manipulation of the Council of State, the FSLN 
government responded by banning an MDN rally and Sandinista 
youths responded by ransacking the MDN's headquarters in 
Managua. The Council of State was further expanded in May 
1981 to fifty-one members; the new seats were filled by 
FSLN supporters.23 This portion of the FSLN's 
institutionalization phase of the revolutionary process 
directly contributed to the departure of two of the 
eventual leaders of the SOF—Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz 
in 1982 and 1981, respectively.24 
Reconcentration "refers to a gradual weakening of the 
power and income positions of political participants from 
the lower echelons of the social pyramid."25 
Reconcentration likewise implies that the revolution has 
survived and has been sufficiently institutionalized so 
that the spoils of the revolution enable the revolutionary 
leaders to move to the top of the pyramid and into the 
position of the "new elite." As with the transfer phase, 
the redistribution phase, and the institutionalization 
phase, counterrevolutionary activity may occur in this 
phase as well. 
In the early post-Somoza period, many of the FSLN 
leaders were sharply criticized for their public 
pronouncements that advocated a simple lifestyle while 
their private lives reflected something quite the opposite. 
Humberto Ortega claimed three houses in a posh sector south 
of Managua—complete with a baseball diamond. Tomas Borge's 
tastes likewise came under fire as Humberto Ortega pointed 
out to him how noticeable his Olympic-sized swimming pool 
was, especially when viewed from an in-coming airliner. 
Comandante Jaime Wheelock's wife imported flowers from 
Europe.26 These excesses should be viewed, however, more as 
examples of pent-up desire for power and its trappings 
reaching their fruition than examples of reconcentration. 
As the revolution matured, however, reconcentration became 
a serious detriment to the FSLN leadership. 
The counterrevolutionary efforts of both the Northern 
and Southern fronts failed to interrupt the revolutionary 
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process to the extent that the FSLN government was impeded 
from establishing a Sandinista nomenklatura. Author Michael 
Radu asserts that the FSLN's effect on the economy—coupled 
with the great disparity of wealth between the Sandinista 
nomenklatura and the general Nicaraguan populace—was 
"perhaps the single most important cause of the swelling of 
the insurgent ranks" in the late-lSSOs.27 The SOF may have 
benefitted from the fomation of a new elite but it was not 
because of their efforts. Top Sandinistas were granted 
exclusive access to well-stocked stores and were granted 
the right to the official dollar/cordoba exchange rate. 
According to high-level defector Roger Miranda, the Swiss 
bank account of Daniel and Humberto Ortega held over $1 
million. 2 8 Clearly the conspicuous habits of the FSLN—both 
in the immediate post-Somoza period as well as during the 
late 1980s—added to the ranks of the anti-Sandinista 
combatants. The SOF had long moved passed its zenith, 
however, by the time the FSLN had reached its zenith within 
the reconcentration phase of the revolutionary process. 
The concept of hegemonic presumption in US foreign policy 
and the formation of the SOF 
Nothing important can come from the South. The axi. of 
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history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to 
Washington, and then goes on to Tokyo. What happens in the 
South is of no importance. 
Henry Kissinger9 
A lot will depend on how Central America comes out. If we 
cannot manage Central America, it will be impossible to 
convince threatened nations in the Persian Gulf and in 
other places that we know how to manage the global 
equilibrium. 
Henry Kissinger30 
It would be irresponsible scholarship not to place the two 
above quotes by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
within their respective contexts.31 Even within their 
rightful contexts, however, the two seemingly contradictory 
comments contain essential elements of truth when one 
examines US foreign policy and why the SOF evolved into a 
more significant leverage tool of US policy in Central 
America in the 1980s. In this section we will briefly 
review why, and in what ways, "nothing important can come 
from the South." Then we will look at why, if the South is 
indeed unimportant, the Reagan Administration could not 
allow Central America to be "lost" within this bipolar 
context of the Cold War. Scholar Lars Schoultz posits the 
view that the foreign policy debate regarding Central 
America was greatly simplified and narrowed in focus 
throughout the Cold War and especially during the Reagan 
Administration. In spite of the fact that both of 
Kissinger's quotes are relatively true. President Reagan 
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used the tenor of the second quote as justification for the 
Reagan Doctrine, low intensity conflict, and the 
exploitation of the complimentary interests between the 
United States and Costa Rica to initiate an aggressive US 
foreign policy toward the FSLN government.32 Finally, we 
will consider the various "missions" of the SOF as defined 
by US policy objectives. 
Several scholars are in agreement with Kissinger's 
low priority view of Latin America contained in his first 
quote. Within the bipolar context of the Cold War, "the 
close attention of the United States is and must be focused 
on Western Europe, the southern rim of Europe, and the Far 
Eastern rim. These areas by virtue of geography, 
population, human skills, and economic and military power 
are the crucial areas in the contest between the United 
States and the Soviet Union." 3 3 In fact, the importance of 
areas like Europe during the Cold War made conflict there 
far too risky as the end result of serious antagonism could 
have been nuclear war. 3 4 The perceived low priority regions 
of the world—much of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central 
America—"often come to serve as a laboratory, where 
outside forces experiment with new ideas in international 
relations. " 3 5 
78 
When we evaluate other elements of strategic 
importance, Latin America and Central America are viewed as 
low priority areas. Central America does not sit atop a 
great reserve of either vital minerals or raw materials 
which, if lost would constitute a major security danger to 
the United States. Additionally, the United States, during 
the Carter Administration, had a total annual trade with 
Central America of approximately $1.8 billion, or less than 
one percent of US foreign trade; only one-half percent of 
the direct US foreign investment, $700 million, was made in 
Central America. Furthermore, as warfare technology 
advanced, the Delta-class strategic nuclear submarine of 
the USSR weakened the strategic importance of Latin America 
as its missiles now had a 4200-mile range compared to the 
previous system that had a 1300-mile range. 3 6 To state that 
Central America is devoid of strategic importance would 
have been a misnomer in 1980 just as such a statement made 
today would likewise be an oversimplification. Jorge 
Domlnguez, however, offers an encapsulating summary: "The 
objective interests of the United States in Central America 
outside of Panama are very modest—so modest indeed, that 
US interests in Central America should be defined almost 
exclusively as subjective interests." 3 7 
In spite of the fact that Central America was 
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seemingly unimportant during the years of the Cold War, US 
policymakers felt compelled to perpetuate the concept of 
hegemonic presumption toward Central America—especially in 
the 1980s. Hegemonic presumption, defined by Abraham 
Lowenthal, is "the belief in this country [US] that the 
entire hemisphere was a rightful sphere of US influence. 
That belief led US officials to regard as unacceptable the 
emergence of any anti-American political group in any Latin 
American country."38 If strategic concerns were minimal, 
hegemonic presumption was maintained in order to validate 
the US role as a major player in the international sphere-
not just Central America. Therefore, to the policymakers of 
the Reagan Administration, Kissinger's second quote of the 
above two was far more accurate. 
If Central America were to fall, what would be the 
consequences for our position in Asia, Europe, and for 
alliances such as NATO? If the United States cannot respond 
to a threat near our borders, why should Europeans or 
Asians believe that we're seriously concerned about threats 
to them? If the Soviets can assume that nothing short of an 
actual attack on the United States will provoke an American 
response, which ally, which friend will trust us then?... 
The national security of the Americas is at stake in 
Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we 
cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would 
collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of 
our homeland would be put in jeopardy.39 
Since Central America was now of such vital 
importance in the struggle between East and West, Nicaragua 
became the specific target of the Reagan Doctrine—the US-
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desired rollback of Soviet influence and revolution in the 
Third World.40 The ghost of past policy failure, as 
manifested in the Vietnam Syndrome, influenced the Reagan 
administration to take up the strategy of low intensity 
conflict as the vehicle for the implementation of the 
Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua. LIC is "a multi-force attack 
deploying a panoply of pressures short of full-scale use of 
combat troops."41 The LIC strategy in Nicaragua consisted 
of four major fronts: 1) Paramilitary Operations, 2) 
Economic Destabilization , 3) Military Operations, and 4) 
a Propaganda Campaign. Between March and November 1981, the 
Reagan Administration had already initiated three of the 
four strategic objectives of the LIC program in 
Nicaragua.42 
The "missions" of the SOF 
At the macro-level, US policymakers advocated the 
sponsorship of the Contras, in general, and the SOF, more 
specifically not because of Central America's strategic 
importance but because of the need to exhibit foreign 
policy prowess in the region. At the micro-level, however, 
US policymakers outlined the Contras' "mission" under 
several different and sometimes contradictory definitions. 
The first CIA-designated mission of the Contras was 
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to serve as an interdictory force designed to halt the flow 
of Cuban/Sandinista weapons north-bound out of Nicaragua 
and into the hands of the Salvadoran-based FMLN Marxist 
guerrilla fighters. Only a rudimentary background in 
Central American geography would indicate that this was not 
the mission of the Contras encamped somewhere near the San 
Juan River in Costa Rica. Part of the reason why the SOF 
was in Costa Rica had to do with the tradition of exile 
invasions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua launched from 
the other's territory. In terms of US foreign policy 
objectives, however, "Costa Rica's anti-militarism made it 
a far more credible victim of * external aggression' than El 
Salvador or Honduras if the administration chose to invoke 
the Rio Treaty against Nicaragua."43 
Prior to a December 1982 US Congressional Contra aid 
vote, a newly formed Contra directorate stated that their 
mission was to facilitate the democratic process in 
Nicaragua.44 A presidential "Finding" in September 1983 
redefined the objectives of US support to the Contras: 1) 
to induce the FSLN to cease support for insurgencies in the 
region, 2) hamper arms traffic, 3) divert FSLN resources 
away from other guerrillas and redirect those resources to 
the anti-Sandinista conflict, and 4) facilitate 
negotiations between the FSLN and the Contras.45 
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At a press conference in February 1985, President 
Reagan used strident rhetoric not only to spell out his 
administrations's policy objectives toward Nicaragua; he 
also implied what role the Contras would play within the 
context of these objectives through the principles of LIC: 
the only way that Reagan would have accepted the 
continuation of the Sandinista government would have been 
if its leaders would have said "uncle." 4 6 
Yet another mission of t h e SOF was that of nuisance 
diversionary force. In September 1984, US Marine Lt. Col. 
Oliver North wrote in his diary, following a conversation 
with Arturo Cruz, that if the Contra forces of the FDN 
based in Honduras "wants pressure relieved a Southern front 
needs to be opened." 4 7 Since forces were already operating 
along the Southern Front at that time, one can only assume 
that Lt. Col. North was perhaps referring to the opening of 
a Southern Front that was more directly managed by the CIA 
and the NSC than the extant forces. 
One interesting yet unlikely contingency mission for 
the Contras was proposed by United Nations' Ambassador 
Jeane Kirkpatrick at a National Security Planning Group 
meeting in 1984. If the US Congress denied funds for the 
Contras, Kirkpatrick theorized, Nicaragua would infiltrate 
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thousands of FSLN military personnel into El Salvador to 
aid the Marxist FMLN insurgents and the US could do little 
about it. In order to defend against the FMLN-FSLN 
offensive launched against the US-backed government in San 
Salvador, Kirkpatrick advocated that, for the time being, 
the Contras would be sent to El Salvador.48 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have examined two of the key 
facilitating factors for why the SOF came into existence: 
the natural counterrevolutionary response to the initiation 
of the FSLN's movement through the four basic phases of the 
revolutionary process, and the concept of hegemonic 
presumption that motivated much of the US foreign policy 
toward Central America. Whereas the SOF had members joining 
its ranks throughout each phase of the revolutionary 
process, the institutional phase was the most important in 
terms of the formation of the SOF. It was not the FSLN's 
victory in 1979 that was the impetus for the formation of 
the Contras or the SOF; rather, it was the "FSLN's 
performance in power" that facilitated the formation of the 
Contras.49 The formation of the SOF, from the standpoint of 
US foreign policy, was a result of framing the issues in 
Central America within the context of the Cold War paradigm 
that required the US to meet its responsibilities in the 
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region in order to meet its responsibilities globally. 
WHY THE CONTRAS ? 
*In the next chapter, the political science as well as 
the more widely used rhetorical terms t o describe the 
Contras will be examined. It is perhaps more appropriate to 
refer to the Contras as a counterrevolutionary movement as 
the Contras of Costa Rica and Honduras w e r e indeed a 
movement with its goal of initiating—in v a r y i n g degrees—a 
counterrevolution in Nicaragua. Just as t h e r e exists a 
clear distinction between the insurgency movement that 
wishes to be the catalyst by which a social revolution is 
launched and the actual social revolution, likewise there 
should be a distinction m a d e between the 
counterrevolutionaries who wish to undermine the 
"revolution in process" and the actual p r o c e s s of reversing 
the policies of the social revolution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LABELLING THE 80F CONTRAS 
The SOF and the Contras, in general, have been defined from 
several different perspectives. The first objective in this 
chapter will be to endeavor to better understand the SOF. 
The method employed to meet this objective will be to 
examine some of the definitions used to label the SOF. 
Finally, a determination will be made as to whether or not 
the SOF represented a clear political philosophy. 
The political taxonomy of the SOF 
In 1952, William S. Stokes published the article 
"Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-American Politics."1 
Stokes explains in great detail the various classifications 
of political actions common in Latin America. Not 
surprisingly, however, is the fact that the section dealing 
with genuine revolution is rather brief. Correlative to 
this is that counterrevolution likewise lacks a lengthy and 
illustrative set of examples—in 1952 or contemporary Latin 
America. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to 
place the Contras within a contextual framework. Certain 
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definitions will be provided that will clarify the location 
of the SOF Contras on the vast Latin American political 
landscape. Furthermore, a discussion of the more rhetorical 
terms that were used to define the Southern Front Contras 
will be presented. When applying political science 
definitions to the SOF, some questions of semantics 
surface: Should the SOF Contras be considered 
counterrevolutionaries? Did the SOF launch an insurgency 
movement against the FSLN government in Managua? Can one 
definitively label the SOF as either an exile movement or 
a guerrilla movement? The following section will address 
these queries and definitions by considering the SOF 
Contras from several different perspectives: 1) the SOF as 
insurgents, 2) the SOF as an exile movement, 3) the SOF as 
a nationalist-based revolutionary front, 4) the SOF as a 
guerrilla organization, and 5) the SOF as 
counterrevolutionaries. 
The SOF Contras as insurgents 
Scholar Jorge Domlnguez has defined insurgency as 
"the use of violence lasting for more than a few hours 
against the established government by a substantial number 
of people who do not occupy formal authority roles."2 The 
greatest weakness of this definition is also its greatest 
strength. Such a broad criteria can become burdensome to 
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the investigator, particularly when this definition is used 
as a tool in comparative analysis; perhaps researchers 
would prefer a definition of greater specificity. 
Conversely, the advantage of this categorization is that it 
is valid without completely dissecting the ideology of the 
subject group. Whereas this definition equally applies to 
the Honduran-based forces of the FDN, Domlnguez makes a 
distinction between these forces which were filled 
primarily from the ranks of the former members of the GN 
and the SOF; Eden Pastora found it difficult to cooperate 
with those whom he felt were his one-time enemies.3 Within 
this definition, should the SOF Contras be considered 
insurgents? 
When considering the time frame of their operations, 
the SOF Contras clearly fit within the parameters of this 
definition. Sporadic and often significant conflict 
initiated by SOF proto-Contras existed along the 
Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border in early 1980. 4 In 1982, the 
interrelated issues of the presence of Nicaraguan 
"refugees" in Costa Rica and the deterioration of relations 
between the Nicaraguan and Costa Rican governments prompted 
Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge to threaten to 
invoke the Rio Treaty of the Organization of American 
States in order to protect its own border.5 In 1983, 
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Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega offered, a 
general retort regarding the level of violence a l o n g b o t h 
of its borders by stating that Nicaraguan armed f o r c e s w e r e 
ordered to return fire across the Honduran and C o s t a R i c a n 
borders. Furthermore, the Ejercito Popular S a n d i n i s t a (EPS-
Sandinista Popular Army) would not stop h o t p u r s u i t of 
Contra forces simply because they reached the b o r d e r . 6 T h e 
conflict had sufficiently de-escalated by 1 9 8 8 t h a t t h e 
Commission on Verification and Follow-up of t h e G u a t e m a l a 
Accord declared that Costa Rica had complied w i t h " t h e use 
of territory" requirements of the Accord. 7 T h e r e f o r e , the 
time length of the violence had indeed lasted l o n g e n o u g h 
to meet this requisite of this definition. 
In terms of numbers of combatants in t h e S O F C o n t r a s , 
in 1980 the SOF, in its seminal, proto-Contra p h a s e , was 
still rather small and informal. In 1983, t h e e s t i m a t e d 
3000-5000 combatants of the SOF had decreased t o 1 2 00-1500 
fighters by the end of 1987. By 1988, with t h e c e s s a t i o n of 
conflict in "the South," the SOF numbers w e r e e s t i m a t e d at 
1000.8 The number of SOF Contras throughout t h e 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 8 
time period evolved into a force that should b e v i e w e d as 
constituting, according to the definition as p o s i t e d by 
Dominguez, "a substantial number of people." 
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The last portion of this definition is to distinguish 
insurgencies from coup d'etats. The S O F Contras also meet 
this qualification as such leaders a s Alfonso Robelo and 
Eden Pastora left their respective government positions 
prior to their involvement in the c o n f l i c t . 9 Additionally, 
Fernando Chamorro was a car dealer p r i o r t o and immediately 
after the anti-Somoza insurgency a nd , unlike Pastora and 
Robelo, Chamorro never held a p o s i t i o n in the post-Somoza 
FSLN government.10 Within each criteria of the definition 
of "insurgency" as pronounced by J o r g e Domlnguez, the SOF 
clearly meets these requirements. 
The SOF Contras as an exile force 
Given the extensive record of exile disputes and 
exile-based invasions between N i c a r a g u a and Costa Rica— 
namely after Costa Rica's 1948 r e v o l u t i o n — a valid question 
would be "Were the SOF Contras an e x i l e force assembled to 
oust the FSLN ?" To best answer t h i s question, a review of 
some of the traditional characteristics of exile disputes 
would prove appropriate. First of a l l , t h e exiles flee or 
are driven from their home countries f o r political reasons. 
Secondly, the exiles organize in t h e country or countries 
that provide them territorial asylum in order that they may 
initiate a forcible return to t h e i r h o m e country. During 
this organizational phase, the e x i l e s will assess their 
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need in terms of training and material assistance. Often 
the exiles will first look to private sources to meet these 
needs; more likely, however, the exiles will solicit 
governmental leaders for this aid. A handful of factors 
determine the amount of assistance the exiles can expect: 
a) the extent of animosity on the part of the host/sponsor 
country toward the government of the exiles' home country, 
b) the degree of sympathy toward the exiles, c) the degree 
to which the leaders in the host/sponsor country can use 
the exiles within the context of their own political 
objectives, d) the extent to which the assistance to the 
exiles can remain as covert as possible as such sponsorship 
is illegal, and e) the odds of success. As assistance is 
granted by the host/sponsor government to the exiles, the 
host government may spread the burden of sponsorship among 
other sympathetic governments which serves to broaden the 
scope of the dispute. 1 1 
Strategy for the exiles is often based more upon 
chance than upon definitive plans. Traditionally, the 
exiles will train in isolated areas in order to maintain a 
covert presence as well as to maintain the element of 
surprise when the force indeed moves against their 
homeland—by air, sea and/or land. The exiles usually 
invade in full force as the strategy for them is to 
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encounter regular army units sent to repel them; the exiles 
likewise serve as the catalyst for a broader popular 
uprising. The host government disavows any involvement in 
the operation while the exiles that they sponsored are 
clearly on their own and are usually engaged in combat for 
a short period of time prior to sustaining casualties, 
being captured, or being pushed back across the border. 
Depending on the policy of the host government, the 
remainder of the exiles may try again from the territory of 
the host, they may try again from the territory of a more 
agreeable host, they may discontinue their efforts, or they 
may continue their efforts without the aid of any host 
government. 1 2 
The SOF clearly met the first basic criteria of this 
definition. In the book, Nicaragua: Revolution in the 
Family, author Shirley Christian describes, in chapter 
nineteen, the plight of several of those individuals and 
often their followers who left their positions within the 
FSLN government and fled to Costa Rica. 1 3 The second 
criteria, however, is certainly more difficult to analyze. 
Some of the members of the SOF, in the early days of the 
Contra War, did indeed go to Costa Rica in order to 
initiate a forcible return into Nicaragua; other Nicaraguan 
exiles, however, stayed well within the confines of exile 
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law.14 At the public level, Costa Rica deported leaders of 
the SOF who violated exile law; within this context, one 
would discern that Costa Rica did not provide the SOF 
exiles "territorial asylum." However, the SOF was granted 
territorial asylum in Costa Rica at 1) a de facto level, 
and 2) a covert level. 
At the de facto level, Costa Rica granted the SOF 
asylum through the inability and inefficiency of the Costa 
Rican Civil Guard and Rural Guard to control the 220-mile-
long Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border and the subsequent 
activities of the Nicaraguan exiles that operated in this 
sparsely populated jungle region. In spite of the open 
admission by the FSLN which acknowledged that the 
government in San Jose was not responsible for the exile 
activity in the border region, the violence along the 
border, nonetheless, was one of several points of 
contention between the governments of Managua and San 
Jose. 1 5 
At the covert level, the Costa Rican government 
likewise provided the SOF with territorial asylum. In the 
early days of the Contra War, the SOF was able to violate 
exile law through the complicity of the Rural Guard. The 
degree of complicity on the part of the Rural Guard, 
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however, was not a widespread issue when compared to the 
more direct policies of the Monge administration in terms 
of providing the SOF with territorial asylum—in spite of 
the long-standing policy of Costa Rican neutrality. Costa 
Rican President Monge, in August 1985, consented to a quid 
pro quo with US officials that stated that Monge "would be 
willing to provide assistance to the Resistance if the 
United States government would help fund a certain 
operation in Costa Rica." 1 6 The "certain operation" was 
most likely either the expansion of the Santa Elena 
airstrip which was already under construction and partially 
completed in northern Costa Rica or the construction of an 
intelligence-gathering facility aimed toward Nicaragua. 1 7 
In terms of funding, the SOF, at first, more or less 
followed the route taken by other exile groups. Shortly 
after the formation of ARDE in late 1982, Alfonso Robelo, 
as a member of ARDE and as the leader of the social 
democratic political party, the MDN, solicited aid from 
other Social Democrats and political liberals. These 
activities were initiated, however, when ARDE was 
promulgating a policy of nonviolent pressure against the 
Sandinistas in Managua. ARDE eventually received CIA funds-
-both directly and through an elaborate network that 
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included several different sources. 1 8 It is at this point 
that the traditional definitions of exile invasion forces, 
in terms of providing support, veer off the beaten path as 
Costa Rica became the host country and the United States— 
either directly or indirectly—became the primary 
sponsoring agent. In analogous terms, it was as if the 
United States agreed to cater in a feast fit for royalty if 
the Costa Ricans would merely provide the dining hall and 
the table service. Clearly, according to the factors used 
to determine the amount of support the SOF should have 
received from their Costa Rican host, it would indicate 
that the Nicaraguan exiles should have garnered substantial 
funding. 
Considerable animosity doubtlessly existed within the 
government in San Jose toward the Sandinista government, 
primarily over five key points of contention: a) the 
perceived direction of the Nicaraguan political system, b) 
the perceived infringement upon Costa Rican navigational 
rights on the San Juan River, c) the perceived Nicaraguan 
involvement in domestic subversion, d) the perceived 
Managua-initiated international disinformation campaign, 
and e) the perceived impingement of Costa Rican national 
honor and dignity. 1 9 When these sources of ill-will between 
San Jose and Managua were combined with the Reagan 
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administration's foreign policy perception and goals for 
the region, support for the Nicaraguan exiles moved closer 
to realization. 
The case for the Costa Ricans providing assistance to 
the SOF is further buttressed by the degree of sympathy 
that existed toward the exiles. Sympathy toward the exiles 
was prevalent at the governmental level through the rural 
and small-town Costa Rican populace. Costa Rican leaders 
favored free elections in Nicaragua in which exile leaders 
like Robelo, who was on good terms with Costa Rican leaders 
(including a very familiar relationship with President 
Monge), would be able to participate. Furthermore, Costa 
Rican townspeople in the border region who were sympathetic 
to the operations of Pastora often gave next to nothing in 
terms of information to Civil Guardsmen; many of the 
officials in the Civil Guard who were likewise sympathetic 
to Pastora turned a blind eye to Comandante Cero's 
activities. Finally, in spite of the fact that the military 
threat posed by Nicaragua toward Costa Rica was more 
rhetorical than real, Costa Ricans overwhelmingly perceived 
Nicaragua as the military threat to the region and more 
than two-thirds of the Costa Rican respondents to the same 
1985 Gallup International survey approved of US assistance 
to the Contras. 2 0 
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The degree to which the Costa Rican government could 
use the presence of the Nicaraguan exiles within the 
context of its political agenda is a rather complex issue 
that combines Costa Rican domestic politics and economics, 
US foreign policy, and Nicaraguan foreign policy toward 
Costa Rica. An interesting anecdote from the 1986 Costa 
Rican presidential campaign represents a good summary: 
Presidential candidate Oscar Arias began to suggest that 
the presence of the exiled Contras endangered Costa Rican 
peace. Arias "even joked that it was too bad Nicaragua 
didn't have a tenth comandante on the party directorate, 
since each comandante was worth $50 million in annual U.S. 
aid to Costa Rica." 2 1 
The extent to which the assistance to the Nicaraguan 
exiles could remain covert was not a significant factor for 
either the Costa Rican government prior to the Arias 
administration or the US government except for 
considerations given to the parameters of US Congressional 
limitations. As was mentioned earlier, the Costa Rican 
Civil and Rural Guards lacked the ability and often the 
willingness to secure its northern border region. SOF 
leaders were indeed expelled from Costa Rica and an ARDE 
safehouse in suburban San Jose was closed. However, the 
Costa Rican government turned "a blind eye to most contra 
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activities inside Costa Rica unless they [were] flagrantly 
exposed in the press." 2 2 Perhaps the US lack of importance 
placed on the maintenance of its covert presence in Costa 
Rica, and the region in general, can best be seen in the 
announcement in 1984 by the Reagan administration that the 
United States would refuse to accept the legal ruling 
presented by the World Court concerning the US involvement 
in the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors. 2 3 
Finally, the amount of assistance that the SOF might 
have received as an exile force from their host was also 
based upon the perceived odds of success. Author-journalist 
Clifford Krauss believes that the Monge administration 
would have perhaps taken a more pro-SOF position if the SOF 
had demonstrated that it was a combat-proven force. 2 4 The 
United States was likewise doubtful of the odds of success 
of the SOF, especially when one considers how Lt. Col. 
Oliver North took command of the operation and dismantled 
the original SOF structure. The misgivings that the North 
network held regarding the SOF, however, had more to do 
with the level of trust that the leaders of the SOF never 
established with their sponsors than their performance on 
the field of battle. 2 5 
Throughout the course of the Contra War, both Costa 
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Rica—indirectly and unintentionally—and the US sponsors 
solicited other countries and individuals to help fund the 
efforts of the SOF which inevitably served to broaden the 
scope of a regional conflict. In early 1982, a deal was 
struck between the US National Security Agency and Israel 
that sent Israeli military advisors and weapons to 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica; some of the arms were 
eventually funneled to the SOF. 2 6 As for the US efforts— 
beyond the more publicized plans of the Iran-Contra 
network—an ARDE intelligence officer shed additional light 
on the subject of expanded outside sponsorship: "In 1983, 
the principal funds arrived from Venezuela and the Germans. 
It was CIA money, sent through covert channels."27 
When considering the issue of strategy within the 
context of traditional exile movements in Central America 
and the Caribbean Basin, it is here that the SOF differs 
greatly. At least two notable plans existed, however, that 
advocated an exile invasion based on more traditional 
strategies. In early 1981, UDN/FARN, through operations 
coordinated by exiled Nicaraguan businessman Raul Arana in 
Tegucigalpa worked to facilitate a kind of exile invasion. 
UDN/FARN, including Fernando and Edmundo Chamorro, hoped 
that small exile bands in the Jinotega region along the 
Honduran-Nicaraguan border would serve as the catalyst and 
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then the support for an internal uprising in Nicaragua. 
A far more comprehensive plan for an exile invasion 
was presented to Gen. John Singlaub (RET.) in April 1986 by 
the contra reform organization CONDOR (Nicaraguan Coalition 
of Opposition to the Regime) . The twenty-page plan called 
for, among other things, the infiltration of Chontales and 
Boaco Departments by Southern Front units as well as 
seizure of the Immigration posts on the Honduran and Costa 
Rican frontiers and simultaneous Southern Front 
infiltration movement toward the Bluefields-El Rama area. 
Point Seven of the CONDOR strategic plan stated that "The 
main attack will be against the city of Managua itself, 
forcing the active participation in the struggle of the 
entire population. There will be an insurrection initiated 
and directed by our forces."29 The ironic fate to this 
rather elaborate plan was sealed when Singlaub met with US 
SOF coordinators in San Jose and failed to mention either 
CONDOR'S report, which was also a damning editorial 
regarding Contra corruption, or the conversation that 
Singlaub had with the CONDOR leadership in Miami. 3 0 
A variation on the traditional exile invasion theme 
that held considerable weight during the Contra War was the 
"liberated territory" strategy. In spite of the schism 
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between Steadman Fagoth and Brooklyn Rivera that sent the 
former to Honduras and the latter to Costa Rica, the basic 
objective of their respective Contra organizations remained 
similar: "both MISURA and MISURASATA [were] to ^liberate a 
region of territory on the Atlantic Coast' and declare a 
* provisional government,' then calling for international 
recognition and US military assistance."31 Likewise, in 
late August 1984, following the La Penca bombing, newly 
formed Contra umbrella organization UNIR, which included 
Alfonso Robelo as the representative from ARDE, advocated 
the declaration of a "territorio liberado" as part of the 
provisional plan of the larger Plan de Gobierno.32 
The SOF clearly exhibited some of the characteristics 
of a traditional exile force, especially in terms of the 
methods in which the various organizations were supported. 
In spite of the fact that plans existed for both more 
traditional exile invasions and "liberated territory" 
seizure and subsequent declarations, the SOF never 
successfully followed through on either of these similar 
conflict strategies. Whereas the SOF met some of the 
criteria contained in the definition of an exile invasion 
force, their actions and strategies demonstrated that the 
SOF did not represent a true exile invasion force. 
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The SOF as nationalist revolutionary force 
On April 15, 1982, Eden Pastora resurfaced in San 
Jose, Costa Rica in order to issue a "severance statement" 
that formalized his break with the FSLN. Additionally, 
Pastora indicated that he would still work within a 
revolutionary framework as the real problem in Nicaragua 
was not with sandinismo but with the manner in which the 
FSLN's National Directorate—and others—had interpreted 
sandinismo. In the same statement, Pastora clearly defined 
himself as an anti-imperialist, lashing out at the 
historical legacy left by US intervention in Nicaragua as 
well as pointing out the imperialistic nature of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union.33 In December 1982, the 
newly formed ARDE issued a statement that explained ARDE's 
position on the peace initiatives that were proposed at 
that time. Also in the statement was a reaffirmation of 
ARDE's nationalist, revolutionary ideals: "Por eso como 
nicaraguenses, como defensores de la soberania, como 
verdaderos dem6cratas y como revolucionarios, consideramos 
un deber impostergable agotar todos los caminos de paz, sin 
renunciar a principios. m 3 4 In order to adequately determine 
if the SOF Contras fulfilled its pronouncements as a 
nationalist, revolutionary front, two important questions 
should be addressed: a) Did the SOF, as reflected in some 
members of their leadership, represent the political spirit 
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of the Nicaraguan people? and b) Did the SOF maintain 
autonomy over their organizations and operations? 
When one considers the composition of the original 
Revolutionary Directorate of ARDE, one may conclude that 
Eden Pastora, Alfonso Robelo, Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro, 
and Brooklyn Rivera represented a broad cross section of 
the Nicaraguan people. These leaders, of course, were not 
without their detractors. 
Eden Pastora, the most popular of the ARDE directorate, was 
viewed with ambivalence by the Nicaraguan people. In a 1983 
Christian Science Monitor story, one former southern 
Atlantic coast resident expressed his positive opinion 
concerning Pastora's continued popularity: "If tomorrow 
Eden Pastora would walk into town, things would start 
happening." In the same story, however, a northern Atlantic 
coast resident commented, "Pastora smells of Sandinista and 
the Atlantic coast people don't want that."35 
Alfonso Robelo should have drawn considerable support from 
both the non-FSLN, non-Marxist, Nicaraguan democratic Left 
as well as the private business sector. A Nicaraguan 
opposition party leader stated, however, that Robelo's 
political party, the MDN, had not built a substantial 
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infrastructure in its rather brief history and that its 
exiled status would only work to diminish further its 
already limited presence in Nicaragua. Furthermore, COSEP, 
the private business and industry federation which Robelo 
once led, avoided involvement in exile politics and 
therefore forged no links with ARDE.3* 
Fernando Chamorro clearly took the most activist stance 
among the ARDE leaders with combat actions against the FSLN 
government dating back to 1980. 3 7 Just a few short months 
after the formation of ARDE, however, "El Negro" and his 
UDN/FARN forces left the organization and reportedly were 
going to Honduras to join with the FDN forces. Chamorro 
claims that he voluntarily left ARDE because of what he 
perceived as ARDE's increasingly softer line toward the 
FSLN. Members of ARDE, on the other hand, claimed that they 
distanced their organization from "El Negro" because of his 
high-profile military activity and because he was 
endangering ARDE's revolutionary credentials through past 
association with Somocistas.38 In reality, the UDN/FARN 
hiatus from ARDE proved to be quite brief. 
Brooklyn Rivera was likewise considered a valuable asset as 
he brought Atlantic coast indigenous groups under the ARDE 
umbrella. Rivera's feud with his brother-in-law and FDN 
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Miskito Contra leader, Stedman Fagoth, however, prevented 
either ARDE or the FDN from mobilizing the full impact of 
the rampant discontent that existed among the Atlantic 
coast indigenous groups. Furthermore, Rivera had differing 
goals than ARDE concerning the motivation behind opposing 
the Sandinista government. This often led him to pursue a 
course of action that reflected the interests of his 
organization, MISURASATA; the goals of Rivera and 
MISURASATA—especially after the La Penca bombing—did not 
always automatically coincide with the overall goals of the 
SOF Contras. 3 9 
In the time period following the La Penca bombing, 
the shifting alliances and the subsequent isolation of some 
groups over the support of other groups did not necessarily 
translate into either greater leadership effectiveness or 
genuine widespread popularity. The short-lived UNIR 
organization that was formed between SOF leader Robelo and 
FDN political leader Calero gave way to UNO in early 1985 
which included Robelo and "El Negro" Chamorro.40 Regarding 
the level of commitment demonstrated by the UNO leadership 
within the context of their stated goals and, in turn, 
their relationship with the Nicaraguan people, Rob Owen— 
the courier for Lt. Col. Oliver North—issued a scathing 
i n d i c t m e n t i n e a r l y 1 9 8 6 : 
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u"° j-8 i n name only. There is more and more fluff being 
added, but there is no substance. I care and believe in the 
boys and girls, men and women who are fighting, bleeding 
and dying. But the reality as I see it is there are few of 
the so called leaders of the movement who really care about 
the boys in the field. THIS WAR HAS BECOME A BUSINESS TO 
MANY OP THEM; THERE IS STILL A BELIEF THE MARINES ARE GOING 
TO HAVE TO INVADE, SO LETS GET SET SO WE WILL AUTOMATICALLY 
BE THE ONES PUT INTO POWER.41 
Evidence indicates that the leaders of the SOF 
Contras reflected many of the views of the key groups 
within Nicaraguan society. For various reasons, including 
their overall perceived credibility among the Nicaraguan 
populace, the SOF leadership could never build a genuine 
consensus among these groups to truly mobilize them. 
In order to present themselves to the Nicaraguan 
people and, in some cases, the international community as 
a nationalist-based revolutionary movement, another 
question arises: were the SOF Contras able to maintain 
autonomy over their organizational structure and their 
operations? A 1984 CIA report stated that ARDE had 
"stronger anti-Somoza credentials than the Nicaraguan 
Democratic Force." 4 2 The anti-Somoza credentials of ARDE 
should be viewed, however, as a paradox; a simultaneous 
blessing and curse. It was the strong anti-Somoza 
credentials that initially caught the attention of the CIA. 
In February 1982, CIA operative Duane Clarridge approached 
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Pastora and arranged a meeting in Mexico. The April 1982 
••severance statement" that Pastora made in San Jose was 
primarily a product of a secretive, informal agreement 
between Clarridge and Pastora. Pastora launched this 
rhetorical barrage toward the FSLN on behalf of Clarridge 
so, in Pastora's words, "the war in the north [Nicaraguan-
Honduran border] would be legitimized."43 Clarridge and the 
CIA envisioned Pastora as commanding the southern front 
that they wanted to operate out of Costa Rica as well as 
have Pastora forge ties with the FDN forces in Honduras: "A 
combination of Pastora's popular support in Nicaragua and 
the military strength of the FDN would increase the threat 
to the Sandinistas."44 The alliance between Pastora and the 
FDN never materialized. The disdain that Pastora held 
regarding the presence of the former GN members in the FDN 
was certainly a hindrance to the alliance. The suspicion in 
which the FDN viewed some of Pastora's fellow travelers as 
well as personality conflicts between Pastora and Honduran 
General Gustavo Alvarez were also to blame for the failed 
alliance. 4 5 The failed attempt at unification of the north 
and the south, however, deterred neither the efforts of the 
CIA to continue to seek such an alliance nor did it deter 
Pastora from accepting CIA support. 
Pastora accepted CIA financial support, stringing the 
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CIA along in a proposed quid pro quo agreement: that 
required ARDE to join forces with the FDN while the CIA 
would reciprocate by providing assistance. In spite of 
clear statements denying the acceptance of CIA funds, ARDE 
received—either directly or indirectly from the CIA prior 
to the La Penca bombing—monthly allowances that ranged 
from $90,000-$625,000.46 Therefore, the report submitted by 
ABC News in April 1984 regarding the SOF contained m o r e 
than just a slight grain of truth: "These rebels are n o w 
under the total control and direction of the CIA."47 A team 
of CIA operatives established several Contra media outlets 
as well as supervised the planning of the more specialized 
operations out of the ARDE office in suburban San J o s e . 4 8 
The degree of direct CIA penetration—within both t h e 
SOF and the Honduran-based Contras—perhaps reached its 
highest level in late 1983 through early 1984 when, in t h e 
words of a CIA operative, "There was a push to have s o m e 
kind of success in Nicaragua...."49 The operative continued 
within the same context: "If the FDN and Pastora's p e o p l e 
can't really do things that hurt, it's got to be worked out 
another way." 5 0 The "other way" in which this was "worked 
out" was for the CIA to conduct operations that w e r e 
considered too sophisticated for the Contras; t h e t w o 
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Contra groups were to take credit for these operations 
while only committing themselves to minimal and indirect 
involvement. Furthermore, the CIA recruited its own 
supplemental force, UCLA (unilaterally controlled Latino 
assets) , which was comprised of Spanish speaking operatives 
from several different Latin American countries; UCLA also 
carried out sabotage missions.51 One of the more notable 
examples of CIA penetration into the operations of the SOF 
Contras was the CIA delivery of a Hughes 500 (H-500) 
helicopter which was originally based in El Salvador. 
Additionally, a little over a week after the delivery of 
the H-500, Nicaraguan-piloted helicopters were launched 
from CIA "mother ships" that provided advanced gun and 
rocket support to suspected FSLN positions prior to a two-
day SOF Contra occupation of San Juan del Norte, 
Nicaragua. 5 2 
The SOF Contras, as the record shows, were greatly 
influenced by outside forces which weakened their 
nationalist-based revolutionary credentials. In early May 
1986, the CIA initiated an agreement with several of the 
closest military and political associates of Eden Pastora. 
In exchange for $5000 for personal use plus a portion of 
legitimate US-Contra aid, these Pastora loyalists shifted 
their support from "poor ARDE" and Pastora to El Negro 
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Chamorro and FARN under the UNO umbrella. Between battle 
fatigue and their CIA-fattened wallets, these former "poor 
ARDE" field commanders sat out the next several months of 
the Contra War in San Jose. Pastora snidely remarked: "It 
is a great drama. They fight with each other to pay the 
bills at the bars now."53 
The body of evidence indicates that while the SOF may 
have indeed represented a viable alternative to the FDN, 
the body of evidence presented here likewise indicates that 
such statements made by Eden Pastora in 1985 that claimed 
that his branch of ARDE spoke "of non-alignment, of an 
anti-imperialism opposed to both Washington and Moscow, of 
nationalism, 1 , 5 4 clearly lacked validity. Furthermore, 
Alfonso Robelo, also in 1985 and representing his branch of 
ARDE under the UNO banner, openly called upon the support 
of both liberals and conservatives in the United States.55 
The SOF could have justifiably made the claim that 
their ranks were not filled with substantial numbers of 
former guardsmen and therefore represented a more genuine 
nationalist force. To stridently define the SOF, however, 
as a true nationalist revolutionary force would be to 
ignore large portions of the credible historical record. 
Each of the prominent leaders of the SOF possessed their 
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own character flaws that undermined their individual and 
thus their organizational nationalist credentials. 
Additionally, the SOF accepted vast amounts of direct and 
indirect economic and material support—in spite of 
repeated denials—from the CIA and US Congressional funding 
sources. When analyzing the nationalist credentials of the 
SOF leadership and the source of the lion's share of its 
support, it is difficult to label the SOF as a true 
nationalist revolutionary front. 
The SOF as a guerrilla force 
The SOF Contras clearly exhibited some of the 
characteristics that could lead one to define it as a 
guerrilla force. Some of the key points of guerrilla 
warfare will be discussed in this section within the 
context of the SOF Contras in order to posit a response to 
the query "Were the SOF Contras a guerrilla force?" The 
issues of guerrilla warfare that have been considered in 
previous sections under different labels include: a) 
outside support to the SOF, and b) the execution of 
autonomous strategies. As these issues have been 
sufficiently covered in the previous sections, the focus of 
this section will therefore be concentrated on a) the 
deployment of guerrilla tactics and b) the level of support 
the SOF was able to receive from the Nicaraguan populace. 
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An interesting and significant example of the 
deployment of guerrilla tactics was the SOF-initiated 
bombing of the international airport in Managua in 
September 1983. The CIA was indeed deeply involved in the 
planning of the air strike named "Voltaje al Sol" which 
included the three small planes of the ARDE air forced 
based at Ilopango Air Base in El Salvador as well as a 
small plane based in the San Jose suburb of Pavas. Three 
planes embarked on their mission with pre-selected targets 
in Managua. Instead of attacking the Presidential House and 
Central Bank as agreed, the pilots of one of the planes 
radioed back to their Venezuelan CIA (UCLA) contact and 
informed him that "they intended to hit the Sandino 
International Airport instead."5* Not only were three 
persons killed—including the two SOF pilots—and four 
Nicaraguans injured but US Senators Gary Hart and William 
Cohen witnessed the destruction just hours after the 
bombing. Their shock at the incident turned to anger when 
FSLN officials clearly indicated the CIA's hand in the 
operation. Hart and Cohen contended that targeting a 
civilian airport would generate resentment rather than 
support among the Nicaraguan populace toward the Contras. 
Furthermore, the maverick and reckless nature of the 
bombing was, in part, the impetus behind the CIA's 
distancing from Pastora's faction of ARDE.57 
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In an optimal scenario, a guerrilla force would build 
an infrastructure of popular support from which to call 
upon for such essential needs as food, weapon storage, 
operational concealment, and basic medical care. Within 
the context of building popular support among the 
Nicaraguan people—both in rural and urban areas—three 
important initiatives undertaken by the FSLN government 
made the task of gaining popular support for the SOF from 
the Nicaraguan people difficult: 1) the changing role of 
agrarian reform, 2) the Sandinista Defense Committees, and 
3) the limited autonomy provisions granted to the Atlantic 
coast region. These factors constituted an additional 
burden to the SOF which, as discussed earlier, was already 
grappling with some leadership and organizational flaws— 
according to the perceptions of some Nicaraguans and some 
of the US benefactors of the SOF. 
Between 1980-1984, the FSLN program of agrarian 
reform experienced two major adjustments. First of all. 
Minister of Agriculture Jaime Wheelock expedited the pace 
of land distribution to peasants both as individuals and 
within cooperatives; Wheelock was responding to "the 
pressure of peasant expectations to control their own 
land." 5 8 Secondly, Wheelock distributed land out of fear 
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that the Contras would gain support from a) campesinos who 
might have been lured by the prospect of personal, 
individual land ownership, and b) from small independent 
landholders who feared that even their small holdings might 
have been confiscated or integrated into cooperatives. In 
June 1983, Wheelock announced that 15,000 manzanas out of 
a total of 117,696 manzanas of land would be given out in 
the Rio San Juan region along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican 
border; these lands were to serve as the basis for the 
"Defense and Production Cooperatives." As the FSLN stated, 
these cooperatives would provide the more traditional 
trappings of an agrarian reform program yet this "new" 
cooperative would go beyond agricultural production and 
social leveling and would give arms to the campesinos which 
would in turn, theoretically, bolster the FSLN's military 
capabilities in these "at-risk" regions. In short, the 
program was "explicitly linked to the counterinsurgency 
effort against the FDN and ARDE."59 
Just as the agrarian reform program served as a 
counterrevolutionary strategy in the vulnerable rural 
areas, the Sandinista Defense Committees (Comites de 
Defensa Sandinista-CDS) served a similar function in the 
urban areas. The CDS evolved from the FSLN-established 
Comites de Defensa Civil of the anti-Somoza insurgency. 
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Former FSLN government official Alvaro Taboada Teran 
described the CDS as having "administrative and political 
functions." Teran continues: "four CDS directors (one for 
each street in the block) [could] exert control over 80 or 
more persons in a given block by means of constant 
watching, control of food rationing cards, and 
recommendations for work, driver license, passport, etc." 6 0 
Little evidence exists that directly demonstrates how the 
CDS intervened in the prevention of the SOF from 
establishing a support base in urban areas. However, and in 
spite of some restructuring by the FSLN and a decline in 
their numerical strength, "the CDSs still provided the FSLN 
with a numerous and committed base, far larger than that of 
any other party."61 Perhaps the CDSs impeded the execution 
of any initiatives on the part of the SOF to make inroads 
into the FSLN strongholds of the middle-class and lower-
class barrios. 
The policy shift initiated by the FSLN in 1985 
regarding the Atlantic coast region basically succeeded in 
removing Brooklyn Rivera and the SOF as viable competitors 
vis-a-vis the Sandinista government in Managua. In 1985, 
Interior Minister Tomas Borge was chosen to manage the FSLN 
policy regarding the Atlantic coast region. Borge was named 
de facto governor of Zelaya province and initiated a two-
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pronged counterinsurgency strategy that "was a masterful 
blend of resolve and compromise. 1 , 6 2 
On one hand, Borge and the FSLN government worked to 
undercut Rivera's power base from the grassroots up by 
assessing and then addressing the basic needs of the 
costefios at the village level. Furthermore, Borge worked to 
undermine Rivera's leadership legitimacy by pledging to 
Miskito combatants that if they ceased fighting they would 
be allowed to return to their home villages and replace the 
existing FSLN security forces which therefore enabled the 
Miskitos to re-establish a sense of autonomy at the local 
level. 6 3 As 150,000 Indians returned to villages that had 
been reconstructed by the Sandinistas, Borge's policies 
served the two-fold purpose of restoring a measure of 
credibility among the costefios regarding FSLN governance as 
well as diminishing the level of support for Rivera among 
the Miskitos. 6 4 
The other phase of Borge's policies involved dealing 
with Brooklyn Rivera at a more personal level. 
Following the breakdown of negotiations between Rivera and 
the FSLN, Rivera defied Borge's enforced exile and entered 
Nicaragua in early 1986. Borge responded by tailing Rivera 
and his band of close loyalists and harassed them to the 
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extent that they eventually were forced out of Nicaragua. 
The bombing of Rivera's encampment near the Miskito village 
of Layasiksa demonstrated Borge's resolve regarding his 
agenda for the Atlantic coast. 6 5 
Some of the strategies initiated by the SOF could 
have been perceived as counter-productive and alienating 
instead of focused and sensitive to the opinions of the 
disgruntled ranks of the Nicaraguan population. On the 
other hand, the FSLN government initiated policies that 
proved to be effective counterinsurgency measures that 
greatly reduced what popular appeal the SOF, and the 
Contras in general, may have enjoyed. Che Guevara, one of 
Pastora's revolutionary icons, commented on guerrilla 
strategy: "The main demands of the peasantry should be met 
to the degree and in the form which circumstances permit, 
so as to bring about the unity and solidarity of the whole 
population." 6 6 Between questionable SOF guerrilla-style 
tactics and FSLN policies, the SOF failed to meet this key 
objective. The SOF, within a strict definition, was not a 
genuine guerrilla force. 
The SOF as counterrevolutionaries 
Much of the previous chapter was devoted to viewing 
the interrelationship between the revolutionary process and 
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the development of counterrevolutionary activity. 
Counterrevolution, according to Jan Knippers Black and as 
mentioned earlier, Mis the displacement, or elimination 
from effective participation, of groups representing strata 
from the base of the social pyramid.,|67 Also, and according 
to the definition of the revolutionary process as posited 
by Black, the FSLN revolution in Nicaragua did not reach 
full fruition. However, as the FSLN government would take 
steps to further the revolutionary process, the SOF would 
take commensurate steps in the direction of 
counterrevolution. Contra leader Jaime Morales Carazo, who 
was admittedly more closely associated with the FDN, 
addressed the semantics of the word CONTRAz 
Los Sandinistas lo identifican peyorativamente como 
contrarrevolucionarios..•.Es sin6nimo de lucha armada u 
oposici6n civil contra la dictadura totalitaria y su 
opresi6n; contra guienes les han privado de sus 
tradiciones, libertades, derechos y valores; contra quienes 
han llevado millares de cubanos, bCilgaros, alemanes 
orientales y otros extranjeros que denominan 
"internacionalistas"....Los verdaderos Contras no se 
sienten ofendidos porque les 11amen Contras. Al 
contrario.68 
Regardless of who qualifies the definition of the word 
Contra, the SOF should be considered a counterrevolutionary 
force. 
The ideology of the SOP 
In Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional 
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Perspective, authors/editors Jiri Valenta and Esperanza 
Duran refer to some of the resulting amalgamation of the 
SOF as "representing *the South'." Valenta and Duran 
continue: "To most Nicaraguans, xthe South' connotes those 
organizations that sustain a belief in deep social and 
economic reforms within a political structure of 
representative democracy." 6 9 In this section, the 
investigation will be focused on revealing any points of 
distinction that would define the ideology of the SOF; did 
the SOF embody the political thought of "the South"? 
Within the personal political philosophies of Eden 
Pastora and Alfonso Robelo, one can see what these members 
of the ARDE Revolutionary Directorate envisioned as their 
ideological direction. Pastora was doubtlessly influenced 
in his political orientation by Panamanian leader Gen. Omar 
Torrijos. Pastora and Torrijos shared the same vision of 
Central American regimes that were the products of non-
Marxist revolutions and that followed a populist agenda 
"that sought to maintain political and economic freedoms 
while channeling public resources to the poor." 7 0 In a 
sense, Pastora believed that he was merely continuing the 
original goals of the tercerista faction of the anti-Somoza 
FSLN which was more nationalistic than Marxist-Leninist in 
its interpretation of sandinismo. Pastora did not perceive 
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himself as a Contra; rather, he considered himself "a xtrue 
Sandinista' who stood for democratic, nonaligned socialism 
and respect for human rights." 7 1 
In 1982, Alfonso Robelo brought his political party, 
the MDN, into the ARDE fold. Whereas the MDN started out in 
1978 as an anti-Somoza party and evolved into an opposition 
party vis-a-vis the FSLN government—especially after 1980-
-the MDN maintained its social-democratic orientation. 
Robelo perhaps placed the social- democratic credentials of 
the MDN into question when he cast his lot with Arturo Cruz 
and Adolfo Calero's FDN to form the Contra organization 
UNO; the 1985 "photo-op" of President Reagan, Lt. Col. 
North, Calero, Cruz, and Robelo was a statement that stood 
in direct contrast to the ideal of operational independence 
of which Pastora at least gave lip service. The social-
democratic vacuum along the Southern Front created by 
Robelo's coalescence with UNO was filled, ideologically 
speaking, by the Bloque Opositor del Sur (BOS). n 
In July 1985, shortly after the formalization of the 
UNO alliance, Pastora and Alfredo Cesar announced the 
formation of BOS which was eventually an amalgamation of 
five opposition groups. The group was supported by the 
Socialist International (SI); in fact, BOS was granted 
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observer status (as was the FSLN) at the SI regional 
conference held in Lima, Peru in June 1986. In spite of its 
social-democratic credentials and its association with SI, 
however, BOS received most of its funds from the CIA.73 
When reviewing some of the ideological stances taken 
by the individuals and groups of the SOF, the SOF did in 
many ways represent the politics of "the South." The three 
examples that were discussed in this section, Pastora, 
Robelo, and BOS, however, all compromised their ideological 
principles in order to maintain the operations of their 
respective organizations. 
Summary 
Upon reviewing some of the labels that have been used 
to classify the SOF, each label has at least one component 
that is clearly applicable to the characteristics of the 
Contras of the Southern Front; some labels are more 
applicable. The SOF was indeed an insurgency force 
according to the basic yet useful definition presented by 
Jorge Domlnguez. In many ways the SOF met the criteria of 
an exile force. The Costa Rican economy, the Reagan 
administration's policy goals for the region, and the ill-
will that existed between Nicaragua and Costa Rica all 
worked in concert to set the stage for a Nicaraguan exile 
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force based in Costa Rica. In terms of funding, however, 
the main support for the SOF came from the CIA and not the 
Costa Rican hosts. In terms of strategy, some plans existed 
that advocated an exile invasion with a subsequent popular 
uprising. Even if the efforts of the Contras could have 
been coordinated to complete such a mission, the US Contra 
managers had plans of a much smaller design for the SOF. 
The SOF likewise exhibited characteristics of being a 
nationalist revolutionary force—especially when compared 
to the FDN in the early days of the Contra War. The SOF, 
however, had its nationalist credentials tainted by its 
acceptance of CIA operational and economic support. As a 
guerrilla force, the SOF lacked the ability to deliver to 
the Nicaraguan populace any significant benefits of 
government. By the end of 1985, the Contra War had already 
facilitated major policy shifts among the FSLN that were 
passed down to the people. Finally, the SOF did not 
represent a strident militaristic stereotype of a 
counterrevolutionary force. However, the SOF did indeed 
oppose the FSLN revolution and—by virtue of the definition 
of counterrevolution provided by Jan Knippers Black—the 
SOF should be considered a counterrevolutionary force. 
In terms of ideology, the various groups that fell 
under the broad listing of the Southern Opposition Front 
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did indeed exhibit political characteristics that 
demonstrated that the SOF not only professed to be social-
democratic in its orientation but that some individuals and 
groups were recognized at more formal levels as being 
social democrats. Each group, however, was highly dependent 
upon the conservative, anti-communist Reagan Administration 
in Washington. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this conclusion is to posit two final 
questions that will both recapitulate and encapsulate: a) 
why did the SOF fail? and b) what is the underlying current 
that is present throughout this work that serves as a 
bridge between its components and draws the work to a close 
that relates to its point of departure? 
It was, of course, a variety of factors that 
contributed to the failure of the SOF. Some of the reasons 
can be found in the character flaws and personalities of 
the leaders of the SOF and how the US-Contra middlemen 
perceived and reacted to these flaws. Sometimes the failure 
of the SOF can be traced back to the goals of US policy in 
the region and how covert policymakers often chose the 
leadership based on characteristics other than leadership 
capability. Likewise, the Costa Rican Presidential 
administrations of Luis Alberto Monge and Oscar Arias 
affected the SOF. Some of the policies of the FSLN also 
hindered the possibility of success for the SOF. 
when the SOF was analyzed as a nationalist 
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revolutionary movement, the research show that each major 
leader had an Achilles' heel that diminished his 
credibility among the Nicaragua populace. Pastora's 
constant objection to an ARDE-FDN alliance was certainly a 
significant component to the Contra War. Pastora's 
objection to the alliance and the subsequent denial of CIA 
funds, however, should not be cited as the major factor in 
the failure of the SOF; Robelo's CIA-blessed alliance with 
Adolfo Calero and Arturo Cruz did not translate into UNO 
victory. The issue of an ARDE-FDN alliance eventually 
became a moot point as Pastora, Rivera, and "El Negro" were 
never fully trusted by Lt. Col. North. In terms of the 
failure of the original SOF structure, Pastora's 
stonewalling on the alliance was only a contributing factor 
to the distrust that North held regarding the SOF. The 
United States is largely responsible for the failure of the 
SOF: "Ambassador Tambs' mission was not, as he testified, 
to build the Southern Front; it was rather to dismantle the 
existing contra armies."1 
Politics in Costa Rica also contributed to the demise 
of the SOF. As was noted earlier. President Monge backed 
off from a greater commitment to the SOF as he doubted its 
combat effectiveness. Monge skillfully maintained a 
balance: "While he was helpful enough to the rebels to 
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secure American economic aid, he never gave the anti-
Sandinista forces his total support."2 Furthermore, 
President Arias demonstrated his resolve on the peace issue 
by ordering Robelo to leave Costa Rica if he refused to 
abide by the Central American Peace Plan. 
Problems among the SOF leaders contributed to the 
failure of the SOF. The politics of neutrality in Costa 
Rica under Monge allowed the SOF to thrive yet not flourish 
and the politics of peace under Arias certainly impeded the 
efforts of the SOF. It is the role of the United States in 
the policies regarding the SOF, however, that was the 
greatest contributor to its failure. It is difficult to say 
if the SOF would have succeeded with more committed CIA 
support; it is almost inevitable that they would fail 
without it. 
The SOF represented a clear alternative to the FDN 
forces, especially in the time period prior to the La Penca 
bombing. Robelo, Pastora, and Chamorro had all served as 
anti-Somocistas. Robelo and Pastora served as Sandinista 
before taking up the struggle against the FSLN. In terms of 
the revolutionary process, the SOF formed more out of 
frustration with the direction of post-Somoza politics 
whereas the former members of the GN moved toward the 
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formation of the FDN without experiencing FSLN governance. 
Many of the labels that were used to analyze the SOF could 
likewise be applied to the Honduran-based Contras. The FDN, 
however, did not have the same ties to the democratic 
socialist community that the SOF at least cultivated from 
time to time. Both the former members of the SOF and of the 
Honduran-based Contras—regardless of ideology and 
loyalties—were faced with reconstructing Nicaragua in the 
wake of the anti-Somoza insurgency and the Contra War. 
CONCLUSION 
*Honey, 455. 
2Krauss, 225. 
136 
WORKS CITED 
Much of the primary resource material that was cited 
in this work was obtained from Nicaragua; The Making of 
U.S. Policy. 1978-1990. The National Security Archive, 
Washington, DC. (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, Inc., 
1991). Through Freedom of Information declassification 
requests, as well as other means, the NSA "locates, 
aquires, organizes, indexes and disseminates government 
documents pertinent to important issues of U.S. defense, 
foreign, intelligence and international economic policy." 
In this work, the cited NSA-obtained documents range from 
US State Department cables from US Embassies in Central 
America through CIA and DIA reports as well as newsletters 
from some of the SOF groups and court documents and US 
congressional reports. 
Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica. Porouesta de paz en 
Nicaragua para la paz en Centroamerica. San Jose, 
Costa Rica: ARDE, 1983. 
Arnson, Cynthia J. Crossroads: Congress. The President, and 
Centra1 America. 2d. ed. University Park, PA: Penn. 
St. Univ. Press, 1993. 
Baumeister, Eduardo. "The Structure of Nicaraguan 
Agriculture and the Sandinista Agrarian Reform." In 
Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege, ed. Richard 
Harris and Carlos M. Vilas, 10-35. London: Zed, 1985. 
Black, Jan Knippers. "Participation and Political Process: 
The Collapsible Pyramid." In Latin America: Its 
Problems and Its Promise, ed. Jan Knippers Black, 165-
190. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 
Bloque Opositor del Sur. 12 apuntes acerca del B.O.S. San 
Jose, Costa Rica: B.O.S., 1985. 
Booth, John A. The End and the Beginning; The Nicaraguan 
Revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1982. 
Brown, Gillian. "Miskito Revindication: Between Revolution 
and Resistance." In Nicaragua: A Revolution Under 
Siege, ed. Richard Harris and Carlos M. Vilas, 175-
201. London: Zed, 1985. 
Charpentier, Silvia. "Costa Rica y la dueda externa." En 
137 
Costa Rica v el sistema internacionalr cdr. Francisco 
Rojas Aravena, 243-255. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990. 
Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. 
New York: Random House, 1985. 
Cody, Edward. "Nicaraguan Rebels Say Funds Adequate." The 
Washington Post. 5 June 1984. 
Dickey, Christopher. With The Contras: A Reporter in the 
Wilds of Nicaragua. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1985. 
Domlnguez, Jorge I. "Insurgency in Latin America and the 
Common Defense." Political Science Quarterly 101 no. 
5 (1986): 807-823. 
. U.S. Interests and Politics in the Caribbean and 
Central America Washington: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1982. 
Eich, Dieter, and Carlos Rinc6n. The Contras: Interviews 
with Anti-Sandinistas. San Francisco, CA.: Synthesis 
Publications, 1985. 
Fagen, Richard. "Revolution and Crisis in Nicaragua." In 
Trouble j n Q U r Backyard; Central America and the 
United States in the Eighties, ed. Martin Diskin, 
126-154. 
Final Report of the LASA Commission on Compliance with the 
Central American Peace Accord. By Charles Stansifer 
and Michael E. Conroy, Co-Chairmen. Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh, 1988. 
Furlong, William L. "Costa Rica: Caught Between Two 
Worlds." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs 29 no. 2 (Summer 1987): 119-154. 
Garvin, Glenn. Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and 
the Contras. Washington: Brassey's, Inc., 1992. 
Gorman, Stephen M. "Power and Consolidation in the 
Nicaraguan Revolution." Journal of Latin American 
Studies 13 no. 2 (November 1981): 133-149. 
Gudmundson, Lowell. "Costa Rica: The Conflict Over 
Stability and Neutrality, 1983-84." Occasional Paper 
138 
Series, Dialogues, no. 36, Florida International 
University, June,1984. 
Guevara, Che. "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method." In Che Guevara 
Speaks. ed. George Lavan. New York: Merit Publishers, 
1967. 
Gutman, Roy. Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American 
Policy in Nicaragua. 1981-1987. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988. 
Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in The 
Nixon White House. New York: Summit Books, 1983. 
Hoffmann, Stanley. Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in 
the New Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing 
Co., 1983. 
Honey, Martha. Hostile Acts: U.S. Policy in Costa Rica in 
the 1980s. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1994. 
. "Nine-year Manhunt Ended Quietly." Tico Times. 
Hopfensperger, Jean. "The rebels who turned against their 
own revolution." Christian Science Monitor. 28 March 
1983, 12-13 (A). 
Kaplan, Morton A. "American Policy Toward the Caribbean 
Region." In Issues in Caribbean International 
Relations. ed. Basil A. Ince et al. Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1983. 
Kinzer, Stephen. Blood of Brothers: Life and War in 
Nicaragua. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1991. 
Kornbluh, Peter. Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987. 
. "US Role in the Counterrevolution." In Revolution 
and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua, ed. Thomas W. 
Walker, 321-349. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 
and Malcom Byrne, eds. The Iran-Contra Scandal: 
The Declassified History. New York: The New Press, 
1993. 
Krauss, Clifford. Inside Central America: Its People. 
Politics, and History. New York: Summit Books, 1991. 
139 
LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States 
in Central America. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 
1984. 
Lake, Anthony. Somoza Falling. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1989. 
Lincoln, Jennie K. "Neutrality Costa Rican Style." Current 
History 84 (March 1985): 118-121, 136. 
Lowenthal, Abraham. "The United States and Latin America: 
Ending the Hegemonic Presumption." Foreign Affairs 55 
no. i (October 1976): 199-213. 
Miranda, Roger and William Ratliff. The Civil War in 
Nicaragua; Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick, CN: 
Transactions Publishers, 1993. 
Morales Carazo, Jaime. La Contra: Anatomla de una multiple 
traici6. ;Bahia de Cochinos de Reagan?. Mexico: 
Planeta, 1989. 
The National Security Archive. The Chronology; The 
Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the Contras. New York: Warner 
Books, 1987. 
Pardo-Maurer, R. The Contras, 1980-1989; ft Special Kind Of 
Politics. New York: Praeger,1990. 
Pastor, Robert. Condemned to Repetition: The United States 
and Nicaraqua. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1987. 
Pastora, Eden. "Nicaragua 1983-1985: Two Years' Struggle 
Against Soviet Intervention." Journal of Contemporary 
Studies 8 no. 2 (Spring/Summer 1985). 
Rogers, David and David Ignatius. "CIA Internal Report 
Details U.S. Role in Contra Raids in Nicaragua Last 
Year." Wall Street Journal. 6 March 1985, 20 (A). 
. "The Contra Fight." Wall Street Journal. 6 March 
1985, 1 (A), 20 (A). 
Radu, Michael, ed. The New Insurgencies: AntJCQTOmunist 
Guerrillas in the Third World. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1990. 
140 
Rojas Aravena, Francisco. Costa Rica: Polltica exterior y 
crisis centroamericana. Heredia, Costa Rica: 
Universidad Nacional, 1990. 
. "1985: Afto del Impasse de Contadora.11 
Occasional Paper Series, Dialogues, no. 63, Florida 
International University, February, 1986. 
. "El Proceso de Esquipulas: El desarrollo 
conceptual y los mecanismos operativos. Heredia, 
Costa Rica: Universidad Nacional, 1989. 
Rovira Mas, Jorge. Costa Rica en los aftos *80. San Jos&: 
Editorial Provenir, 1987. 
SSenz Biolley, Melvin. "Costa Rica y Nicaragua: tensiones 
naturales, dificultades constantes • En Costa Rica y 
el sistema internacional, de Francisco Rojas Aravena, 
137-180. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990. 
schoultz, Lars- yatjpn^x gegmrity and vnitefl States Policy 
toward Latin America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1987. 
Sklar, Holly. Washington's War on Nicaragua. Boston: South 
End Press, 1988. 
Shelton, Sally. ffEstados Unidos y Centoamerica." Cuadernos 
semestrales de Estados Unidos 6 no. 2 (1979). 
Soils, Luis Guillermo. "Costa Rica y Estados Unidos." En 
Costa Rica v el sistema internacional, de Francisco 
Rojas Aravena, 23-48. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990. 
Stokes, William S. "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin-
American Politics." Political Science Quarterly 5 no. 
3 (Sept. 1952): 445-468. 
Taboada Ter&n, Alvaro. "Aspects of the Evolution of Law in 
Sandinista Nicaragua." In Conflict in Nicaragua: A 
Multidimensional Perspective, ed. Jiri Valenta and 
Esperanza Dur&n, 67-88. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987. 
Tomasek, Robert D. "Caribbean Exile Disputes as a Special 
Regional Type of Conflict in the Field of 
International Relations." 
. "A Comparitive Analysis of the Peace Proposals 
for Central America: Contadora, the Reagan-Wright 
141 
Plan, and the Arias Peace Agreement.,f Conference 
Paper, presented December 1987. 
. "The Deterioration of Relations Between Costa 
Rica and the Sandinistas.11 Occasional Papers Series 
no. 9 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 
The Center for Hemispheric Studies, September, 1984. 
. "United States Policy toward the Contadora Peace 
Process in 1984 and 1985." Paper presented at the 
Midwest Association of Latin American Studies 
Conference, St. Louis, MO., September 26, 1986. 
The Tower Commission Report. By John Tower, Chairman. New 
York: Bantam Books and Time Books, 1987. 
Tucker, Robert W. "The Purpose of American Power." Foreign 
Affairs 59 no. 2 (Winter 1980/81): 241-274. 
U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense. The 
Challenge tQ Pemopragy jji Central Aro?rig». Washington, 
DC: 1986. 
Valenta, Jiri and Esperanza Duran, ed. Conflict in 
Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective. Boston: 
Allen and Unwin, 1987. 
and Virginia Valenta. "The FSLN in Power." In 
Conflict jn Nicaragua: A flultifliff3ngJQh$4 Perspective, 
ed. Jiri Valenta and Esperanza DurSn, 3-40. Boston: 
Allen and Unwin, 1987. 
Vargas LLosa, Mario. "In Nicaragua." The New York Times 
Magazine. 28 April 1985, 39-45, 76-87. 
Wattenburg, Ben and Karlyn H. Keene. "Kissinger and 
Moynihan: Five Years Later." Public Qpinion, 6 no. 2 
(April-May 1983). 
142 
